Competition in the Dutch consumer credit market

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Abstract

This paper considers the degree of competitiveness of the Dutch consumer credit market. We use the well-known Bresnahan–Lau method that estimates a structural model consisting of a demand relation and a supply relation, based on aggregate data. The level of competition is derived from the estimated conjectural variation elasticity. Our empirical results show that there is no evidence of market power.

JEL classification: G21; L13

Keywords: Banking; Market power; Consumer credit

1. Introduction

The effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the perceived degree of imperfection of financial markets. With market frictions, some borrowers have better access to external funds than others have. According to the credit view, borrowers’ financial structure affects monetary transmission. As Bernanke and Gertler (1995, p. 28) describe it, ‘...the direct effects of monetary policy on interest rates are amplified by endogenous changes in the external finance premium, which is the difference in cost between funds raised externally [...] and funds generated internally ...’. They explain

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(pp. 34–35) that frictions in financial markets will cause an external finance premium, and that the size of this premium will be affected by monetary policy. Such imperfection in capital markets is a prerequisite for the credit channel to exist.

The general approach to studying the credit view has concentrated on the effect of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit, and the effect of bank credit on firm behaviour and consumer behaviour. Much empirical work has been done on these topics. The reader is also referred to some of the papers in this issue. In this paper, however, we examine the existence of the credit view from a different perspective, by considering imperfections in the credit market directly.

Bernanke and Gertler (1995, pp. 44–45) argue that financial imperfections affect not only firm behaviour but also household borrowing and spending decisions. In particular, they refer to consumers’ expenditures on housing and durable goods. For housing, they discuss how monetary policy may affect residential investment via the mortgage rate. This effect may be due to both the bank lending channel and the bank balance sheet channel. A similar reasoning applies to consumer durable goods demand, in particular for durable goods purchased using consumer credit. If imperfections prevail in the consumer credit market, monetary policy may affect consumers’ expenditures on durable goods via the interest rate on consumer credit. For this reason, it is interesting to see what kinds of imperfections prevail in the consumer credit market. For example, asymmetric information may be present. Borrowers inevitably have better information about their prospects than lenders. This issue may be particularly relevant for consumer credit, since it is likely that banks have less problems in obtaining information about a firm than about an individual agent. In this paper, we concentrate on another important type of friction: imperfect competition among banks. If suppliers of credit exert market power they are likely to not fully transmit central bank’s policy changes.

We analyse the Dutch market for consumer credit and try to measure the degree of competition. Although the consumer credit market may not be the most interesting market in terms of volume, it is definitely very interesting to both consumers and monetary authorities. For example, in February 2000 Statistics Netherlands announced that one out of three Dutch households makes use of consumer credit. Macroeconomic concerns play a role as well. Because of income and wealth effects in consumption and the possible effect of consumer confidence, the situation in the consumer credit market likely affects the business cycle. For monetary authorities the retail banking sector is a focal point of interest. The consumer credit market is like the deposit market characterised by a close bank–customer relationship. In this paper we examine empirically whether banks and finance companies are able to exert market power on the market for revolving consumer credit, concentrating on the case of The Netherlands for the period January 1993–August 1999.

In the academic literature on banking, several authors have tried to assess the level of competition in banking markets, at different levels of aggregation. Some consider the whole of submarkets on which banks operate, sometimes modelling the deposit side explicitly (Suominen, 1994) but generally considering deposits as inputs (e.g. Shaffer, 1993; Molyneux et al., 1994; Shaffer and DiSalvo, 1994), while others concentrate on one (or more) specific submarket(s). The latter generally consider
one or more of the following three markets: the market for business loans (e.g. Hannan, 1991; Neven and Röller, 1999), the mortgage market (e.g. Swank, 1995; Neven and Röller, 1999), or the market for deposits (e.g. Hannan and Liang, 1993; Swank, 1995). To our knowledge, there is no such study that considers the market for consumer credit.

For European countries, studies of market power in banking sectors have generally found evidence of monopolistic competition or collusive conduct (see Molynieux et al., 1994; Neven and Röller, 1999; De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Bikker and Groenveld, 2000). On the other hand, casual observation of the large amount of advertisements on consumer credit in recent years in The Netherlands suggests that competition in this particular market is relatively strong. Our empirical results do indeed indicate that the Dutch consumer credit market is characterised by perfect competition.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the econometric model we use in order to assess the level of competition. Section 3 describes the data on which the analysis is based. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and its results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Assessing the degree of competition among banks

Various econometric models exist to test whether or not firms exert market power and to estimate the degree of competition in a market (for examples, see Martin, 1993, chapter 18). Two methods dominate, especially for more recent studies with respect to banking: first, the method of Panzar and Rosse (1987), and second, the conjectural-variation method or its alternative specification generally referred to as the method of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). We will discuss these approaches below, concentrating on the banking sector.

The method of Panzar and Rosse (1987) estimates reduced-form revenue equations from bank-specific data. A revenue equation relates total revenue of a bank (the dependent variable) to bank output or assets, input prices, interest expenses, and other costs. The more recent literature generally adds a market demand equation in which total bank output or assets are explained by market price (interest rate), aggregate income, price of a substitute, and other exogenous variables. The system of the revenue equations and the demand equation is estimated using a system estimator. The sum of the coefficients of the input prices from the revenue equation has become known as the Panzar–Rosse statistic ($H$). It can be interpreted as the sum of elasticities of gross revenue with respect to input prices. The Panzar–Rosse statistic provides a one-tailed test of competition: if $H > 0$, any form of imperfect competition is rejected. This shows the weak spot of the approach. If $H$ turns out to be negative, the hypothesis of perfect competition cannot be rejected. In that case, the test is inconclusive. Furthermore, the interpretation of $H$ as a sum of elasticities is unclear from a theoretical point of view.

The conjectural-variation method provides an alternative tool. It is based on Iwata (1974), who introduced a method to econometrically estimate conjectural variations.
This approach also involves the estimation of a system of equations. The first equation describes inverse market demand; the second equation is a (bank-specific) supply function, derived from the first-order condition for profit maximisation. One of the parameters of the supply function equals the conjectural variation (the bank’s anticipated response of its rivals to an output change), from the estimate of which the level of competition in the market can be inferred. The econometric estimation of the system involves an identification problem, which was solved by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). Both Bresnahan and Lau use an alternative parameterisation given by the conjectural variation elasticity (see Dickson, 1981). Also, they concentrate on aggregate data in their articles. Although this is in no way crucial for their analysis, when the conjectural-variation(-elasticity) method is applied to aggregate data it is generally called the ‘method of Bresnahan and Lau’. This is the approach we will use in our analysis.

The conjectural variation elasticity of bank \( i \) is defined by

\[
\lambda_i = \frac{dQ/Q}{dq_i/q_i},
\]

where \( Q \) denotes aggregate output of the bank asset under consideration and \( q_i \) is the output of bank \( i \). It describes the response of aggregate output relative to a change in the individual bank’s output, as conjectured by bank \( i \).

Assuming that each bank’s goal is to maximise its profits, the market equilibrium will be characterised by equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue as perceived by the bank (this is the first-order condition for profit maximisation). With perfect competition, the perceived marginal revenue of the bank equals the price (interest rate). At the other extreme, for collusion, it corresponds to the marginal revenue of the whole banking industry. As Shaffer (1993) explains, the banking industry’s marginal revenue can be described as industry price \( P \) plus a function \( h(\cdot) \) of aggregate output and other exogenous variables, where the function \( h(\cdot) \) is defined as

\[
h(\cdot) = \frac{Q}{dQ/dP}.
\]

It describes the semi-elasticity of market demand. The bank’s perceived marginal revenue however does not need to be equal to the industry’s marginal revenue. In fact, for bank \( i \) the perceived marginal revenue equals \( P + \lambda_i h(\cdot) \). The range of possible values of the conjectural variation elasticity \( \lambda \) is given by \([0,1]\). The two polar cases are perfect competition, \( \lambda = 0 \), and perfect collusion (or monopoly), \( \lambda = 1 \). For any type of oligopoly, \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \); the specific case of symmetric Cournot oligopoly results in a value of \( \lambda \) equal to the inverse of the number of banks (i.e. the market share). This shows that \( \lambda \) can be used as a measure for the level of competition.

The method of Bresnahan and Lau estimates an aggregate conjectural variation elasticity \( \lambda \) which can be interpreted as the industry average conjectural variation elasticity. The parameter \( \lambda \) is estimated from a simultaneous system of two equations. The first equation describes aggregate asset quantity demanded \( Q \) as a func-
tion of price (interest rate) $P$, income $Y$, and (at least) one other exogenous variable $Z$. The additional exogenous variable $Z$ is introduced in order to solve the identification problem in estimating $\lambda$, for which it is crucial that $P$ enters interactively with an exogenous variable. In this way, it becomes possible for the slope of the asset demand function to change as a reaction to changes in exogenous variables, which results in identification of $\lambda$ as was shown by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). For completeness, one might also allow for other interactions between the variables or include other exogenous variables. The demand relation can be interpreted as a first-order local approximation of the true aggregate demand function. The second equation of the system is a supply relation based on the assumption of profit maximisation discussed above. Using a linear\(^1\) marginal cost (MC) function, the supply relation can be written in reduced form as $P = -\lambda h(\cdot) + MC + u$, where $u$ is an error term. Omitting the time subscript, the Bresnahan–Lau method thus consists of the simultaneous estimation of the (non-linear) system

\begin{align*}
Q &= a_0 + a_1 P + a_2 Y + a_3 Z + a_4 PZ + e, \\
P &= -\lambda \frac{Q}{a_1 + a_2 Z} + b_0 + b_1 Q + b_2 W_1 + b_3 W_2 + u,
\end{align*}

where the $a$'s, $b$'s, and $\lambda$ are the parameters to be estimated, $W_1$ and $W_2$ are input prices (e.g. wages and, for banks, deposit or money market rates), and $e$ and $u$ are error terms. Note that the parameter $a_4$ of the interaction term in the demand equation is crucial for the identification of $\lambda$; if we were to omit the interaction term, we could only estimate $-(\lambda/a_1) + b_1$ and we would have one estimate for the two structural parameters $\lambda$ and $b_1$.

Several previous studies have applied the Bresnahan–Lau approach to banking sectors. For example, for US banking, Shaffer (1989) uses the method to show that banks are more competitive than Cournot competition. For the Canadian banking industry he obtains a similar result (Shaffer, 1993). Suominen (1994) estimates the model for the case of Finland distinguishing between two periods, before and after deregulation, with the surprising result that some market power was present in the banking sector during the second period whereas in the first period competition was strong. A dynamic version of the approach was applied to banking by Swank (1995). He concludes that the Dutch markets for mortgages and savings were less competitive than Cournot competition, with the level of competition increasing over time for mortgages and decreasing over time for savings deposits. Zardkoohi and Fraser (1998) use the Bresnahan–Lau method in order to assess the effect of geographical deregulation in US banking, using annual observations on the individual states, finding only a small effect since the level of competition was already high before deregulation.

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\(^1\)Shaffer (1993, p. 52) uses a translog cost function. He argues that this type of cost specification may be more realistic for the case of depository institutions. However, the econometric estimation of the model with this specification requires a variable that describes total cost of a firm, or a bank in our case. Since this information is not available for our case, we do not use this specification.
We observe that the Bresnahan–Lau approach relies on some important assumptions. First, as was mentioned above, the banks are assumed to maximise profits. Second, banks are assumed to be price takers with respect to inputs. This may be a realistic assumption for labour (especially if one uses wages as determined in collective agreements, as we do below) as well as for funds obtained from the money market. However, if one would consider money borrowed from consumers, i.e. deposits, the corresponding input price (the deposit rate) may not be taken as given by the banks and the assumption of price-taking behaviour may be violated. If banks have market power in the deposit market (i.e. monopsony power) in the estimation of the above system this will be attributed to the credit side and result in overestimation of the level of market power in the credit market (as explained in Shaffer, 1999, p. 191). As Shaffer (1993, p. 54) remarks, this assumption implies that the Bresnahan–Lau test of competition is robust in the sense that a finding of \( \lambda = 0 \) indicates that there is no market power at all. Third, banks are assumed to be risk-neutral. However, since \( \lambda \) picks up any deviation of price from marginal cost, if banks are risk averse and there is a positive risk premium, this may result in \( \lambda > 0 \) even in the competitive equilibrium (Shaffer, 1999, p. 185) and the results of the empirical analysis must be interpreted carefully.

Finally, the Bresnahan–Lau method is a static model that describes market equilibrium. Recently, Steen and Salvanes (1999) developed a dynamic version of the Bresnahan–Lau model, based on an error-correction framework. They apply it to the French market for fresh salmon. Their model describes long-run relationships for both demand and supply, and short-run deviations from these relationships. For a discussion of the model, see Toolsema (2001). We will consider the application of this dynamic approach to the Dutch consumer credit market in the next section. Swank (1995) has applied a similar extension based on an error–correction mechanism to banks. However, his approach is based on two markets, one for (mortgage) loans and one for deposits. It is based on a demand equation that describes demand for loans, a supply equation that describes the supply of deposits, and a cost function for banks that relates the two markets. Swank derives two first-order conditions that describe the behaviour of the bank. These equations can be compared to the supply equation of the Bresnahan–Lau method, which should also be interpreted as a first-order condition for profit maximisation. The two equilibrium conditions describe how the bank determines the loan rate and the deposit rate, respectively. Each equation involves a parameter that corresponds to \( \lambda \), the conjectural variation elasticity. In this way, Swank is able to measure market power in both markets. Since the present paper is more partial in the sense that we concentrate on one particular market, we do not use his approach here.

3. Data description

The sample period of our study is January 1993–August 1999. Because of the availability of data on a monthly basis, we are able to confine ourselves to a relatively short and recent period. This is important since the number of actors in the
market has changed dramatically in the last decades due to mergers and take-overs. The most recent merger between large actors took place in 1990 (ABN and AMRO), so well before the period under consideration here. The precise start of the period was partly dictated by the fact that the definitions of the raw data on which we based our data set are different before and after this month. On the other hand, it is an interesting starting point since in January 1993 the Second European Banking Directive, which provides the legal framework for cross-border banking in the European Union, came into force.

Since bank-specific data are not available for all variables required for the Dutch consumer credit market, we use aggregate data. With respect to consumer credit, we can distinguish among revolving and fixed credit. Revolving credit refers to a credit limit, up to which the consumer can borrow any amount, and the amount of credit actually used can be adjusted (upward or downward) at any time. Fixed credit refers to a fixed amount borrowed. That is, a consumer gets a loan of fixed size that he cannot adjust, and has to repay this amount plus interest according to some given repayment scheme. We concentrate on revolving credit. We remark that we measure the amount of credit outstanding, not the credit limits, i.e. we do not measure unused commitments. The data allow us to distinguish between commercial banks and finance companies, which generally are subsidiaries of banks or insurance companies (Van Ewijk and Scholtens, 1999, p. 308). However, estimating the model for these two groups separately may not give correct results, since the loans of the groups are close substitutes to consumers. Therefore, we will not present those results in great detail. We will concentrate on the total revolving consumer credit issued by these two groups of actors in the market, and we will generally refer to them as banks. Further, credit card credit as well as consumer credit provided by municipal money-lending institutions and mail-order firms (which together have a market share of less than 10%) are not included in the analysis. The data we use in order to estimate the Bresnahan–Lau model will be discussed below. For a detailed overview of the data and its sources, see the appendix.

In general, a system of demand and supply equations should be estimated using stocks, not flows. From the standard portfolio model, stocks are correlated with yields. So, for the aggregate output of revolving consumer credit \( Q \) we use the nominal quantity of revolving credit outstanding. Since the raw data concern the quantity outstanding \textit{per ultimo} of that month, we compute an average in order to increase precision (in particular with respect to \( P \); see below) and loose one observation, i.e. January 1993. Note that this quantity is net of interest and cost payments,

\[ 2 \text{ The main reason why we do not present results for fixed credit is that the data available on fixed credit force us to use flows (i.e. newly issued loans) instead of stocks (the amount of loans outstanding) – see below. Also, the data include the total amount of cost and interest to be paid during the complete term of the loan whereas the terms of the loans are unknown, implying that the computed price variable is merely a proxy for the actual interest rate. For these reasons, and because the estimation results are very disappointing in the sense that hardly any variable is significant and the \( R^2 \)’s are very low, we do not present the results.} \]
where cost payments refer to costs other than interest and repayment of the principal, for example to administrative costs.

For the price variable \( P \) we use interest and cost payments divided by quantity. To be more precise, \( P \) is defined as total interest and cost payments in the month under consideration, divided by the quantity of credit outstanding \( Q \), times 100. We interpret \( P \) as the interest rate on revolving consumer credit (on a monthly basis).

The variable \( Y \) in the theoretical model represents income, and in empirical studies it usually refers to GDP. Data on GDP however do not exist on a monthly basis for The Netherlands. The commonly used alternative is industrial production (an index number with base 1995 = 100). The sign of the income elasticity is ambiguous.

Income can be interpreted as ability to pay. On the one hand, this may refer to ability to pay for consumer credit, implying a positive coefficient. On the other hand, it may refer to ability to pay for the goods bought with consumer credit, in the sense that a high income may imply less need for consumer credit. This explanation implies a negative sign. An alternative interpretation of \( Y \) is that of a measure of general economic activity or conditions. In that case, an alternative variable that could be used is consumer confidence. Since consumer confidence provides information on confidence and expectations of consumers with respect to economic activity, in this interpretation it can basically perform the same role as GDP in the model.

In general, in applications of the Bresnahan–Lau method to banking markets a money market interest rate is chosen for the other exogenous variable in the demand equation, \( Z \). This rate can be interpreted as the price of a substitute, an exogenous variable that is used often in applications of the Bresnahan–Lau approach. In our case, we need the short-run (money market) rate in the supply equation, as will be discussed below. For \( Z \) we therefore choose to use the long-run rate (10-year government bond yield). Alternatively, we could use the mortgage rate. The mortgage rate can be interpreted as the price of a substitute, and the corresponding parameter is expected to be positive. However, the mortgage rate closely follows the long-run rate, and the results do not depend much on the rate we use.

As input prices we use hourly wage rates (denoted by \( W_1 \)) and the money market rate (\( W_2 \)). \( W_1 \) is an index with base 1990 = 100, and is based on collective agreements on wages in the banking sector. \( W_2 \) is the interest rate on three-month loans to local authorities, the usual choice for the money market rate in The Netherlands. An alternative rate that could be used for \( W_2 \) is the deposit rate. For finance companies, however, the deposit rate would not be a good choice since they generally do not obtain funds from deposits. Furthermore, in the literature the money market rate is usually interpreted as the appropriate marginal cost for banks. We converted the interest rates (i.e. \( Z \) and \( W_2 \)) to a monthly basis and computed them as a percentage. In this way, their definitions correspond to that of the price variable. For an overview of the data, see Fig. 1.

Finally, we remark that we do not deflate nominal variables. There are several reasons to act as such. First, money illusion plays a role in the case of consumer credit. We do not expect the average Dutch consumer to investigate his real interest payments on consumer credit. Probably, he will concentrate on nominal values. Second, inflation in The Netherlands has been relatively constant over the period under con-
sideration (around 2% per year). This implies that the main effect of inflation, if any, will be that of a trend. Therefore, we use nominal variables in our analysis and include a deterministic trend as a regressor. Third, we observe that Shaffer (1993, pp. 55) suggests that qualitative differences between real and nominal specifications of the Bresnahan–Lau model are not to be expected.

4. Empirical analysis

For the empirical analysis of the Dutch consumer credit market, we start by comparing the price $P$ to the maximum authorised rate of interest on consumer credit, which is determined by the Dutch government. Banks are not allowed to set their consumer credit rate above this maximum rate. The maximum rate is adjusted

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3 Data on the maximum rate have been obtained from the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs.
whenever indicators of the capital and money markets show that there has been a ‘considerable’ change since the previous adjustment. In the period under consideration, there have been 11 adjustments (where the first was on 1 January 1993). Although this implies that there is not much variation in the maximum rate, we do expect $P$ and the maximum rate to change in the same general direction.

The price variable $P$ is converted to an annual interest rate in order to compare it to the maximum annual rate. Fig. 2 shows the interest rate for revolving consumer credit on an annual basis as well as the maximum rates for various credit limits. The higher the credit limit, the lower is the maximum rate. For example, the upper curve represents the maximum rate for a credit limit in between 0 and 2500 guilders. From the figure, we conclude that the average actual consumer credit interest rate set by the banks is strictly below even the lowest maximum rate (i.e. the rate that corresponds to the category of highest credit limits).

The maximum rates for various credit limits for revolving credit are perfectly correlated with each other (as well as with those for fixed credit), and therefore with respect to the correlation coefficients it does not matter which limit we choose. The correlation coefficient of the maximum rate with the consumer credit rate $P$ (on an annual basis) is 0.97. This high value does not come as a complete surprise because it is an empirical fact that interest rates are highly correlated. Furthermore, the maximum rate is based on an indicator of the money market by construction and it seems reasonable to assume (which is confirmed by our estimation results) that the actual rate of interest on revolving consumer credit in a particular month depends strongly

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Fig. 2. Consumer credit rate $P$, converted to annual basis, and maximum annual interest rates.

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For converting the price variable to an annual basis we use the formula $100[(1 + P/100)^{12} - 1]$.  

The categories of credit limits are 0–2500, 2500–5000, 5000–10000, 10000–15000, 15000–20000, 20000–30000 and 30000–50000 guilders.
on the money market rate in that month. This implies that we should in fact expect to observe very high correlation coefficients.

If the equilibrium of demand and supply observed in the market would be in the region were regulation actually limits the rate that banks set, we would observe a rate equal to the maximum authorised rate, and excess demand. However, from Fig. 2, we conclude that the regulatory rates are well above the actual market rates, and regulation does not seem to constrain the banks in setting interest rates. This implies that effectively there is no regulation; the actors in the market are able to set their interest rates in a profit maximising way and the Bresnahan–Lau model can be applied in order to assess the level of market power.

Now we turn to the estimation of the Bresnahan–Lau model. Since the two Eqs. (1) and (2) are interrelated because of the underlying economic model (through the semi-elasticity of market demand which appears in the supply relation), one should employ a system estimator such as three-stage least squares (3SLS) or full information maximum likelihood (FIML) rather than a single equation (limited information) method such as two-stage least squares (2SLS). We use FIML in order to estimate the non-linear system.\footnote{For the econometric analysis we use EViews, which makes use of the Marquardt algorithm for non-linear estimation.} \footnote{Next to being complete system approach, this estimation method has some other advantages. First, FIML does not require the use of instruments, as does 3SLS. Previous studies have used many instruments (see for example Suominen, 1994). As we have observed using our data, by varying the instruments included one can manipulate the results of the estimation quite a lot. Second, the results of non-linear 3SLS depend on the starting values for the parameters. With our data we also find this effect and we doubt whether the best local solution found is actually the global solution.}

Table 1 presents the estimation results for revolving consumer credit. We present three specifications. In the first, we estimated the basic model (adjusted from the system \{(1),(2)\})

\[
Q = a_0 + a_1 P + a_2 Y + a_3 Z + a_4 PZ + a_5 \text{TREND} + e, \tag{3}
\]

\[
P = -\lambda Q' + b_0 + b_1 Q + b_2 W_1 + b_3 W_2 + u, \tag{4}
\]

where \( Q' = Q / (a_1 + a_4 Z) \). We include a deterministic trend (that equals \( m \) and for the \( m \)th observation) in the demand equation. The sign of the coefficient of the trend is expected to be positive, since there has been a considerable change of attitude of consumers in favour of consumer credit, even in this recent period under consideration. From Fig. 1, the amount of revolving consumer credit \( Q \) is clearly increasing over time. Because \( Y \) and \( \text{TREND} \) are strongly correlated with each other as well as with \( Q \), which may imply multicollinearity, we also estimated the above system without \( Y \) as well as without \( \text{TREND} \). In each case, we eliminated non-significant parameters (except for the crucial parameter \( \lambda \)), and present the resulting final model.

Since 1997, there exists a maximum to the amount of interest payments on consumer credit that a consumer can deduct from income before taxes every year. Therefore, we included a dummy (which equals zero before January 1997 and one from that month on) in the demand equation in order to allow for a demand decrease...
due to this tax measure. Intuitively, we did not expect this dummy to be very important, since the maximum annual deduction has been around 5000 guilders (10000 guilders for a married couple) which we believe to be relatively high. Indeed, in all specifications, the coefficient of the dummy was not significantly different from zero (as expected) and therefore we omit this variable in the discussion of the results.

The adjusted $R^2$ is high for (almost) all estimated equations. Unfortunately, the Durbin–Watson statistics are low. This is a common problem in the empirical literature using the static Bresnahan–Lau approach. Here, it may be caused in particular by the use of monthly stocks for revolving credit. The estimated signs of $Z$ and the input price $W$ contrast our expectations. The long-run rate of interest $Z$ may not simply perform the role of a substitute price here. There may be other effects as well. For example, the long-run interest rate may affect consumers’ impressions or expectations of general (future) interest rate developments. Such effects may explain why its coefficient is negative. The market power parameter $\lambda$, the coefficient of $Q^*$, is also found to be negative in one of the specifications. Although the negative sign of $\lambda$ is not what we predicted in Section 2, it is not necessarily wrong. It means that price is below marginal cost. For an individual bank, this is possible temporarily for example because of unexpected losses or as a result of an attempt to increase market share. We estimate a market-average value for $\lambda$ which makes it less likely to find a negative value. However, the estimate of $\lambda$ is very close to zero in all cases and the corresponding t-statistics are small in absolute value, indicating that $\lambda$ is not significantly different from zero. Using alternative variables, i.e. the mortgage rate for $Z$ and consumer confidence for $Y$, does not alter the results in an important way. Also, estimating the model {$(3),(4)$} for banks and finance companies separately, we find that for

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<td>DW</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      |             |             |               |
| **Supply (4)**       |             |             |               |
| $Q^*$                | 0.00014     | -0.00112    | 0.00122       |
|                      | (0.60)      | (-0.89)     | (0.57)        |
| Constant             | 2.76        | 2.97        | 4.94          |
|                      | (7.62)      | (6.57)      | (2.92)        |
| $Q$                  | 4.33E−05    | 5.38E−05    | 0.00011       |
|                      | (3.89)      | (3.52)      | (2.09)        |
| $W_1$                | -0.03       | -0.03       | -0.05         |
|                      | (-5.58)     | (-4.87)     | (-2.43)       |
| $W_2$                | 1.10        | 1.18        | 1.52          |
|                      | (12.92)     | (10.37)     | (4.19)        |
| Adj. $R^2$           | 0.89        | 0.87        | 0.59          |
| DW                   | 0.95        | 0.83        | 0.62          |
both groups, $\lambda$ is not significantly different from zero. Concluding, Table 1 shows that our data do not support the hypothesis of market power for revolving consumer credit.

The low Durbin–Watson statistics indicate positive serial correlation. This could imply very significant $t$-statistics (as explained in an intuitive way by Kennedy, 1998, pp. 122–123). Indeed, we find that most variables are highly significant. However, $\lambda$, the parameter of interest is not significant in any specification we estimated. Still, this suggests that it may be interesting to use a dynamic model. We have tried to estimate the model developed by Steen and Salvanes (1999), but this turned out to be problematic. The main reason seems to be multicollinearity, in particular in the demand equation. This is partly due to the interaction term that is necessary for identification, but is strongly correlated with other variables. For details, see Toolsema (2001). A final issue in the estimation of the dynamic model is that of stationarity of the market power variable $Q^*/C^3$. We computed this variable using the static parameter estimates from Table 1 (as in Steen and Salvanes, 1999) in order to determine its order of integration. It turned out that we cannot reject the hypothesis that $Q^*$ is stationary (i.e. of integration order 0) for any reasonable significance level. This implies that it should not be included in the long run of the dynamic model. This would also indicate that in the long run, there is no market power, confirming our static estimation results.

5. Conclusion

We investigated empirically the level of competition in the Dutch market for revolving consumer credit using the Bresnahan–Lau approach. Our analysis indicates that this market is characterised by perfect competition. This conclusion is different from the results of studies of market power in banking sectors of several European countries which generally find evidence of monopolistic competition or collusive conduct ($0 < \lambda \leq 1$). One explanation could be that consumer credit serves as a loss leader to banks, attracting new clients that they can sell other (profitable) services as well, but not earning the bank any profits itself.

As we mentioned in Section 1, imperfection in capital markets is a prerequisite for the credit channel to exist. Our empirical results suggest that the credit view is not relevant. However, more research on the topic is warranted in two directions. First, it is important to realise that banks may well have market power in general, the level of which may vary among different submarkets. Because the consumer credit market is small compared to the total banking industry, it may well be the case that there is perfect competition in this submarket whereas banks have market power in other, larger submarkets. This is confirmed by findings of other authors. Second, it seems reasonable to assume that there is asymmetric information in this market, in the sense that the consumers themselves are better informed with respect to their prospects than the banks. The result that banks do not abuse market power in the consumer credit market does not imply that the market is frictionless.
Appendix A. Data and sources

The sample period is January 1993–August 1999. Some of the data have been obtained from Statistics Netherlands StatLine. This can be found at http://argon2.cbs.nl/statweb/indexned.stm.

\( Q \) is the nominal quantity of revolving consumer credit outstanding at banks and finance companies net of corresponding interest and cost payments, computed as the average of the quantity at the end of the month under consideration and the quantity at the end of the previous month (millions of guilders). Source: Statistics Netherlands StatLine.

\( P \) is the price of revolving consumer credit outstanding at banks and finance companies, obtained by dividing cost and interest payments in the month under consideration by net quantity outstanding \( Q \) and multiplying by 100 (percentage). \( P \) thus corresponds directly to the monthly interest rate. Source: Statistics Netherlands StatLine (for 1993–1997 we compute cost and interest payments as the difference between gross and net quantity of consumer credit issued; for 1998–1999 cost and interest payments are available directly).

\( Y \) is industrial production (index with 1995 = 100). Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). (We have used consumer confidence as an alternative. This variable provides information on confidence and expectations of consumers with respect to developments of Dutch economic activity; it is measured as the balance between positive and negative answers to a questionnaire as a percentage of the total. Source: Statistics Netherlands StatLine.)

\( Z \) is the 10-year government bond yield (gby; originally on annual basis); adjusted so as to correspond to a monthly basis using 
\[
Z = \left(1 + \text{gby}\right)^{1/12} - 1
\]
and multiplied by 100 (percentage). Source: Thomson Financial Datastream, NLBRYLD: NL benchmark bond 10 years (DS). (We have used the mortgage rate as an alternative. We used the average rate of interest of all newly registered mortgages for dwelling houses and combinations of dwelling houses and business premises, adjusted so as to correspond to a monthly basis and multiplied by 100 (percentage). Source: Statistics Netherlands StatLine.)

\( W_1 \) refers to the hourly wage rates (from collective agreements) including holiday allowance and other benefits for banks (index with 1990 = 100). Source: Statistics Netherlands Sociaal-Economische Maandstatistiek (various issues).

\( W_2 \) is the money market interest rate: interest rate on three-month loans to local authorities; adjusted so as to correspond to a monthly basis (see the discussion of \( Z \)) and multiplied by 100 (percentage). Source: Statistics Netherlands StatLine.

References


