PART V

Security Design: The Demand Side View
Consumer Liquidity Demand

12.1 Introduction
As studied in Chapter 5, corporations and financial intermediaries secure their liquidity on the asset side of their balance sheet through lines of credit and the hoarding of liquid assets. They also manage their liquidity on the liability side. Short-term debt drains liquidity much more than long-term debt or securities, such as preferred equity and common equity, that embody a valuable option of not being forced to pay (preferred or common equity) dividends if times get rough.

By assuming that investors’ utility is represented by the present discounted value of their consumptions (with a discount rate normalized at 0), we have ignored their own liquidity demand. In practice, consumers face personal shocks and value the flexibility of being able to realize their assets when they need to. For example, ignoring differences in rates of return, they value demand deposits over and above savings that are locked in for a few months or years. They hoard substantial amounts of liquid assets in order to insure against shocks. They are willing to sacrifice returns in order to make sure they will have enough money to buy a house or a car when the opportunity arises, to send their children to (more or less expensive) college, or to protect themselves against illness or unemployment. Thus, consumers compete with corporations for the available stock of liquidity.

Consumer liquidity demand has been the focus of a large and interesting literature, starting with the seminal papers of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983).

1. Unless they are worried about a time-inconsistency problem and do not want to be exposed to the temptation to consume, see, for example, Laibson (1997).
2. This competition has been little studied in the literature unfortunately.

12.2 Consumer Liquidity Demand: The Diamond–Dybvig Model and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

12.2.1 Insuring against Liquidity Shocks
The Diamond–Dybvig model depicts the optimal contract between a financial intermediary and a consumer who faces uncertainty as to the timing of her consumption. The model, in its simplest and most common form, has three periods, \( t = 0, 1, 2 \).

Consumer preferences. Consumers are ex ante identical. For notational simplicity, let us assume that they have no demand for consumption at date 0, and therefore invest their entire date-0 resources, 1 per consumer. More generally, their savings are

equal to 1 per consumer. They have no further re-
sources at dates 1 and 2, and have state-contingent
preferences over date-1 and date-2 consumptions,
c_1 and c_2, given by
\[
\begin{align*}
\bar{u}(c_1) & \quad \text{if impatient (probability } \lambda), \\
\bar{u}(c_2) & \quad \text{if patient (probability } 1 - \lambda),
\end{align*}
\]
where the function \( \bar{u} \) is increasing and strictly
cave, and \( \bar{u}'(0) = \infty \). Consumers do not know at
date 0 whether they will be impatient (“face a liquid-
ity shock”) or not. They learn at date 1 their “type”
(patient or impatient).\(^4\) In the simplest version of
this model there is no aggregate uncertainty, and so
exactly a fraction \( \lambda \) of consumers will want to con-
sume at date 1.

The specification of consumer preferences em-
bedded in (12.1) is a simple-minded way of formaliz-
ing the idea that the consumer does not know when
she will need money.\(^5\)

Technology. Date-0 resources are invested in
short-term (liquid) and long-term projects. Short-
term projects yield \( r_1 \) at date 1 per unit of date-0 in-
vestment. Similarly, 1 unit of investment (in a short-
term project) at date 1 yields \( r_1 \) at date 2. Long-term
projects yield \( R > 1 \) at date 2 per unit of date-0 in-
vestment, and nothing at date 1. Liquidity is costly
as long-term projects have a higher yield:
\[ r_1 < r_2 < R. \]

In words, an investor with a long-term perspective,
that is, one who would be unconcerned by the pos-
sibility of a liquidity shock (\( \lambda = 0 \)), would invest in
the long-term asset rather than in a short-term asset
that she would roll over at date 1 (see Figure 12.1).

Without loss of generality, let us assume that
\[ r_1 = 1. \]

This production function defines a technological
yield curve. Let \( r_{LT} \) denote the per-period return on
the long-term asset:
\[ (1 + r_{LT})^2 = R \text{ or } r_{LT} = \sqrt{R} - 1. \]

In comparison, a short-term investment at date 0
yields rate of interest
\[ r_{ST} = r_1 - 1 = 0 < r_{LT}. \]

The technological yield curve is upward sloping.

Liquidating a long-term investment at date 1
yields a salvage value \( l \) per unit of date-0 investment.
In this section, we will assume for simplicity that this
salvage value is equal to 0, but more generally it will
be assumed to be lower than \( r_1 = 1 \) (if \( l \geq 1 \), the
long-term asset dominates and there is never any
investment in short-term assets).

Lastly, the representative investor must decide
how to allocate her savings between short-term in-
vestment \( i_1 \) and long-term investment \( i_2 \):
\[ i_1 + i_2 = 1. \]

12.2.2 Self-Provision of Liquidity Is Inefficient

As is the case for corporate liquidity demand and for
a related reason, self-provision of liquidity—a con-
sumer’s investing in liquid assets solely to cover her
own liquidity shock—is wasteful. If the consumer
happens not to face a liquidity shock, the costly liq-
uidity that she has hoarded is wasted. Somehow,
the community of consumers should be able to use the law of large numbers to reduce their investment in liquid assets while enjoying the same amount of liquidity.

**Autarky.** To demonstrate the inefficiency of an “autarky situation” (as it is called in the literature), suppose that, as announced earlier, \( I = 0 \), and that the representative consumer invests \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) in short- and long-term assets. Then, because \( r_1 = 1 \),

\[
c_1 = i_1 \quad \text{and} \quad c_2 = r_2 i_1 + R i_2 = R - c_1(R - r_2).
\]

(12.2)

As the consumption \( c_1 \) when the depositor is impatient grows from 0 to 1, the date-2 consumption enjoyed by the patient incarnation falls from \( R \) to \( r_2 \). The representative consumer therefore maximizes her expected utility:

\[
\max_{c_1} (\lambda u(c_1) + (1 - \lambda) u(R - c_1(R - r_2))).
\]

(12.3)

Indeed, the optimization with respect to \( (i_1, i_2) \) can be reduced to one over the date-1 consumption, since \( c_1 \) determines the investment in short-term assets needed and therefore the investment in long-term assets as well. This optimization yields either an interior or a corner solution:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{either} & \quad \frac{\lambda u'(c_1)}{1 - \lambda u'(R)} = R - r_2 \\
\text{or} & \quad c_1 = 1 \quad \left( \frac{\lambda u'(1)}{1 - \lambda u'(R)} > R - r_2 \right).
\end{align*}
\]

(12.4)

It is easy to check that the fraction invested in liquid assets \( i_1 = c_1 \) grows when the probability \( \lambda \) of facing a liquidity shock increases and when the “technological premium” associated with a long-term investment, \( R - r_2 \), decreases. Note, in particular, that everything is invested in the short-term asset when this premium is low or when the probability of a liquidity shock is high.

**The benefits from pooling liquidity: mutual funds.**

The autarky outcome studied above precludes any resale. We have emphasized the excessive investment in liquid assets (possibly to the level of the consumer’s entire savings). The flip side of the same coin is that any investment in the long-term asset is thrown away (as \( i_1 = 0 \)) when the consumer turns out to be impatient. Somehow the opening of date-1 resale markets should generate gains from trade. Long-term assets held by impatient consumers are very attractive to patient consumers, who could use their own liquid assets to purchase the impatient consumers’ long-term assets.

Along these lines let us show that a mutual fund enables consumers to enjoy the same date-1 consumption as under autarky, with a much larger date-2 return. Let \( (c_1, c_2) \) denote the consumptions under autarky (they solve (12.2) and (12.4)). Let the consumers invest in a mutual fund with short- and long-term investments:

\[
\begin{align*}
i_1 = \lambda c_1 & \quad \text{and} \quad i_2 = 1 - \lambda c_1,
\end{align*}
\]

That is, they invest less in short-term assets and more into long-term ones than under autarky. This mutual fund distributes dividends equal to \((s_2 = i_1)\) at date 1, and \(i_2 R\) at date 2. At date 1, the impatient consumers resell their share of the mutual fund to patient consumers, who compete with their scarce resources (the dividends they receive at date 1) for this valuable asset. The date-1 mutual fund price \( p \) is such that the patient consumers’ resources, \((1 - \lambda) i_1\), equal the value of the shares sold by the impatient ones:

\[
(1 - \lambda) i_1 = \lambda p.
\]

The impatient consumers then consume

\[
c_1 = i_1 + p - \frac{i_1}{\lambda} = c_1.
\]

At date 2, the patient consumers each consume

\[
c_2 = \frac{i_2 R}{\lambda - 1}
\]

since they end up holding not only their initial shares, but also the shares of the impatient consumers and therefore own \((1/(1 - \lambda))\) shares of the fund each. It is easily checked that

\[
\begin{align*}
c_2 &= \frac{1 - \lambda c_1 - R}{\lambda - 1} = c_2 - c_1(R - r_2).
\end{align*}
\]

These computations show that the resellability of assets allows consumers to economize on liquidity provision and thereby increases their welfare.
Let us next compute the mutual fund's optimal portfolio: because
\[ i_1 = \lambda c_1 \quad \text{and} \quad i_2 = \frac{1 - \lambda}{R}c_2, \]
The optimal portfolio solves
\[ \max_{\rho_i} \left\{ \lambda u(c_1) + (1 - \lambda)u \left( \frac{1 - \lambda}{1 - \rho}R \right) \right\}, \]
yielding
\[ \frac{u'(c_1)}{u'(c_2)} = R. \]
Note that the optimal mutual fund does not fully insure consumers against liquidity shocks \((c_1 < c_2)\). It is optimal to take advantage of the upward-sloping yield curve and sacrifice some insurance. We will come back to this point shortly.

**Comparison with corporate liquidity demand.** To sum up, and as we have already noted, an important analogy between corporate liquidity demand (Chapter 5) and consumer liquidity demand (this chapter) is that corporations and consumers alike must obtain some insurance against liquidity shocks. Such insurance is costly when long-term investments have higher returns than short-term ones. Accordingly, liquidity ought to be hoarded sparingly and dispatched properly. When shocks are not perfectly correlated among economic actors (corporations, consumers), liquidity can be pooled and fewer low-yield investments are needed in comparison with the situation in which these actors self-provide liquidity. Or, put differently, anarchy results in an overprovision of liquidity.

Consumer and corporate liquidity demands, however, differ in at least two respects:

- A key theme of corporate liquidity demand is that investments in short- and long-term assets, while competing for scarce resources at date 0, are later on *complements*, as liquidity enables long-term assets to bear their fruits. There is no such complementarity in the consumer liquidity demand model.
- A consumer consumes the cash that she receives, and *does not create any pledgeable income* (in the notation of Chapter 5, \( \rho_0 = 0 \)). This observation has several consequences. First, the consumers' total investment is equal to their savings or "cash on hand" \((i_1 + i_2 = A - 1)\) here, while firms can invest more than their cash on hand \((i_1 + i_2 > A)\). In particular, the only way for consumers to satisfy their liquidity needs is to invest in real, low-yield, short-term assets. By contrast, Chapter 15 will show that, under some circumstances, the private sector may create enough "inside liquidity" and avoid having to invest in low-yield assets.

### 12.2.2 Optimal Liquidity Insurance

The mutual fund is only one of many ways available for pooling liquidity. Another familiar financial institution through which consumers pool their liquidity is the bank. Demand deposits allow consumers to choose the timing of withdrawals. A bank, of course, does not hold an amount of liquid assets equal to the level of demand deposits. Rather, it uses the law of large numbers to economize on liquid assets, as it knows that only a fraction of consumers will withdraw their deposits at any point in time.

More generally, one may wonder about the nature of the "optimal insurance scheme." The first point to note is that it is optimal to match the maturities of investments and consumptions. Given that there is no aggregate uncertainty and so one can predict exactly the levels of investment that are needed for date-contingent consumptions, investing \(i_1 > \lambda c_1\) and rolling over the unneeded income \((i_1 - \lambda c_1)\) is dominated by investing just what is needed for date-1 consumption \((i_1 = \lambda c_1)\) and investing the rest in the higher-yield long-term asset. And so (12.5) holds.

### Footnote

6. For instance, the two-shock model of Section 5.3.1 can be rewritten by adapting the notation slightly to facilitate the comparison with the consumer liquidity demand. Recall that the entrepreneur chooses investment scale \(i_0\) that, if the liquidity shock is met at date 1, yields total income \(\lambda x\) and pledgeable income \(\rho x\) (with \(\rho < \lambda\)). With probability \(\lambda\), the firm may pay \(\lambda x\) to salvage a fraction \(x\) of its assets, with probability \(1 - \lambda\), it faces no shock at the intermediate stage. Letting \(i_1 - 1 = i_2 = \lambda x \rho\), the breakeven and NPV conditions were given by

\[
i_1 + i_2 - A = \lambda x (1 - \lambda) \rho x
\]

and

\[
U = \left[ \lambda x (1 - \lambda) \rho x, i_2 = (1 - \lambda) \rho x \right].
\]

Recall from Chapter 5 that, at the optimum, \(x - 1\) if \(\rho (1 - \lambda) < 1\) and \(x = 0\) if \(\rho (1 - \lambda) = 1\). In particular, \(x\) is non-negative, while in the optimal mutual fund policy of the risk-neutral version of Diamond-Dybvig (the consumer's expected utility is \(\rho x + (1 - \rho x)\)), \(i_2 = 0\) as long as \(x > 1\) (since versions of production technologies can also be studied as to facilitate the comparison with the Diamond-Dybvig model with risk-averse consumers).
The optimal allocation must then solve (12.6), yielding, again, a solution characterized by (12.7). Let \((c^*_1, c^*_2)\) solve (12.7) and \(c^*_2 = (1 - \lambda c^*_1 R)/(1 - \lambda)\).

**Implementation by a deposit contract.** The optimal allocation can be implemented by a bank deposit contract provided that the rate of interest received by the consumer on this deposit depends on the date at which she withdraws. Namely, the consumer receives rates of interest \(r^*_1\) and \(r^*_2\) on deposits withdrawn at dates 1 and 2, such that

\[1 + r^*_1 = c^*_1 \quad \text{and} \quad (1 + r^*_2)^2 = c^*_2.\]

Let us follow Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and most of the subsequent literature in assuming that the consumers’ coefficient of relative risk aversion exceeds 1:

\[
\frac{\partial u(c)}{\partial c} > 1 \quad \text{for all} \quad c.
\]

This assumption is empirically reasonable (see, for example, Gollier 2001, Chapter 2). Equation (12.7),

\[
\frac{\partial u(c)}{\partial c} - R > 0,
\]

can then be shown to imply that

\[1 < c^*_1 < c^*_2 < R.\]  
(12.8)

We have \(r^*_2 > r^*_1\) and \(c^*_2 < c^*_1\).

In words, the optimal insurance scheme flattens the yield curve relative to the technological yield curve. Note that, while the optimal insurance scheme flattens the yield curve relative to the technological one, no prediction can be made concerning its slope. If risk aversion is low (the coefficient of relative risk aversion is close to 1), the yield curve is upward sloping. If risk aversion is very high (the coefficient of relative risk aversion goes to infinity), then consumptions at the two dates are almost equalized and so the yield curve is downward sloping (the interest on long-term deposits is compounded and yet does not exceed the short-term deposit interest rate).

We have not yet wondered about whether this deposit contract is “incentive compatible.” For example, would the patient consumers not want to withdraw at date 1 and reinvest the proceeds in the date-1 short-term technology yielding \(r^*_1\)? Indeed if \(r^*_2 > 1\), and risk aversion is large, then \(c^*_2 > c^*_1\) from our previous analysis, and so it is indeed in the interest of patient consumers to feign impatience, cash out, and reinvest. Let us therefore assume at this stage that the bank is able to observe who is patient and who is not, or, equivalently, is able to prevent reinvestment elsewhere. This assumption is unrealistic, especially in a decentralized market economy, but it has the pedagogical merit of separating insurance concerns from incentive compatibility issues in a first step. Let us be “patient” and delay the discussion of incentive compatibility for a more general treatment in the next section.

**More general preferences: suboptimality of mutual funds (advanced).** The equivalence between mutual funds and demand deposits breaks down for more general specifications of preferences. Suppose with Jacklin (1987) that the representative consumer’s preferences are more generally given by

\[u^I(c^1_1, c^1_2) \quad \text{with probability } \lambda \text{ (impatient),} \]

\[u^P(c^2_1, c^2_2) \quad \text{with probability } 1 - \lambda \text{ (patient).} \]

To make sense of the terminology, one can imagine that the impatient type has a higher marginal rate of substitution between date-1 and date-2 consumptions \((\partial u/c_1)/(\partial u/c_2)\) than the patient type. Ignoring again incentive compatibility questions, the optimal allocation then chooses investments and consumptions so as to solve

\[
\max_{\lambda} \frac{\lambda u^I(c^1_1, c^1_2) + (1 - \lambda) u^P(c^2_1, c^2_2)}{R} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \lambda c^1_1 + (1 - \lambda)c^2_1 = \frac{|\lambda c^1_2 + (1 - \lambda)c^2_2|}{R} = 1,
\]

(12.9)

since \(\lambda c^1_1 + (1 - \lambda)c^2_1\) is needed to deliver the total date-1 consumption and \(\lambda c^1_2 + (1 - \lambda)c^2_2\) is what it takes to deliver the total date-2 consumption.
Thus marginal rates of substitution are equalized:

\[ \frac{\partial u^1}{\partial c_1^1} = \frac{\partial u^2}{\partial c_2^2} \]

Furthermore,

\[ \frac{\partial u^1}{\partial c_1^1} / \frac{\partial u^1}{\partial c_2^2} = R \quad \text{for } \theta \in \{L, P\}. \]

In contrast, a mutual fund mechanism equalizes only marginal rates of substitution if \( p \) denotes the price (in terms of date-1 consumption) of shares in the date-2 dividend, then each type \( \theta \in \{L, P\} \) faces a date-1 budget constraint,

\[ c_2^2 = \lambda c_2^2 \left( \frac{p R}{\theta} \right), \]

and maximizes \( u(c_1^1, c_2^2) \) subject to this constraint. Thus marginal rates of substitution are equalized:

\[ \frac{\partial u^1}{\partial c_1^1} / \frac{\partial u^1}{\partial c_2^2} = \frac{\partial u^2}{\partial c_1^2} / \frac{\partial u^2}{\partial c_2^2}. \]

But, in general, the mutual fund scheme contains no mechanism to redistribute across types. The consumer enters date 1 with the same budget (dividend plus resale value) regardless of her type. This insurance shortage must be remedied through a different scheme, in which the consumer gets the solution to (12.39), \((c_1^1, c_2^1)\) when impatient and \((c_1^2, c_2^2)\) when patient. Assuming \( c_1^1 > c_1^2 \) and \( c_2^1 < c_2^2 \), this can be accomplished by a combination of long-term savings that are locked in until maturity and deliver \( c_2^2 \) at date 2, together with a deposit contract that offers the option of withdrawing the total amount \( c_1^1 \) at date 1 versus withdrawing the smaller amount \( c_2^1 \) in exchange for return \((c_1^1 - c_2^1)\) at date 2.

Moreover, if we rule out redepósits outside the bank offering such contracts, it is no longer clear that the optimal allocation is incentive compatible, that is, that type \( \theta \in \{L, P\} \) prefers \((c_1^1, c_2^1)\) to \((c_1^2, c_2^2)\) for \( \theta' = \theta \) (while this created no difficulty with the more special preferences studied earlier). (Noninnocuous) conditions need to be imposed to guarantee that the optimal allocation is incentive compatible (see Jacklin 1987).

Interbank lending. As shown by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), interbank lending performs a useful pooling function when banks suffer idiosyncratic shocks in their depositors' withdrawal rates. Thus, suppose that there are two ex ante identical banks. The fraction of impatient depositors will be high \((\lambda_1)\) in one bank and low \((\lambda_2)\) in the other. So there is no aggregate uncertainty. The average withdrawal rate is \( \lambda = \frac{1}{2}(\lambda_1 + \lambda_2) \). But there is idiosyncratic risk: no one knows at date 0 which bank will face the high withdrawal rate.

The banks can reach the efficient outcome by granting each other credit lines. They invest \( i_2 - \lambda c_2^2 \) and \( i_2 = (1 - \lambda)c_2^2 / R \) per consumer each and re-dispatch the liquid asset between the two when the shocks accrue. The liquidity poor bank (with withdrawal rate \( \lambda_1 = \lambda_0 \)) can transfer some of the claim to the proceeds \( i_1R \) on its long-term investment to the liquidity rich bank (with withdrawal rate \( \lambda_2 = \lambda_0 \)) in exchange for \( \frac{1}{2}(\lambda_0 - \lambda)c_2^2 \) at date 1.8

12.2.4 Financial Markets and the Jacklin Critique

A common theme in the economics of information and incentives is that markets conflict with the optimal provision of insurance (e.g., Pauly 1974; Hofmann and Laffont 1975; Bernheim and Whinston 1986). Jacklin’s (1987) critique of the Diamond-Dybvig model fits within this overall theme.

In a nutshell, Jacklin argues that financial markets’ ability to arbitrage the implicit cross-subsidy in favor of the impatient relative to the technological yield curve undermines the overall insurance mechanism.

Suppose that a consumer initially bypasses the insurance system and invests her entire savings in the high-yield long-term asset \((i_2 = 1)\). This strategy clearly delivers the highest possible payoff if the consumer turns out to be impatient, since then \( c_2^1 = R > c_2^2 \).

But what if the consumer ends up being impatient? The trick is then to sell the claim to the long-term payoff to the patient consumers, who use their ability to withdraw their deposits at the bank in order to finance the purchase. Normalize the number

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8. The analysis by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) is much broader than reported here. In particular, it also deals with situations in which banks are imperfectly informed about each other’s solvency (investment in or return on the long-term assets, or the number of withdrawing depositors).
of shares issued by the consumer at one (divisible) share. A patient consumer can withdraw an amount $c_1^*$ from the bank and is willing to pay price $p$ per share for $x$ shares such that

$$c_1^* = xp,$$

as long as she gets at least as much consumption at date 2 as when she leaves her money at the bank:

$$aR > c_1^*.$$

That is, the consumer who has invested in the long-term asset can obtain price $p$ for the claim on this asset, such that

$$p = \frac{c_1^* R}{c_2} > c_2^*.$$  

In effect, this opportunistic consumer free rides on the banks’ costly provision of liquidity. She can have her cake and eat it too.

More generally, the same reasoning shows that any insurance scheme is undone by financial markets as long as $c_2 < R$. Hence, in the presence of financial markets, the best feasible allocation is

$$c_1 = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad c_2 = R. \quad (12.10)$$

Financial markets force the yield curve back to the technological yield curve. The reader will find in Allen and Gale (1997) useful complements on free riding and the underprovision of liquidity.

Remark (differential access to financial markets). Diamond (1997) studies the intermediate case in which some consumers have access to financial markets (as in Jacklin 1987) while others do not (as in Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Suppose, for instance, that everyone is ex ante identical. At date 1, the consumer learns her type. But there are now three types rather than two: an impatient type (receives $c_2$) and two patient types. In Diamond’s terminology, those with access to financial markets are “type 2A,” while those with no such access (who cannot reinvest the money they withdraw at date 1) are “type 2B.” The bank is unable to tell the different types apart. The date-0 optimal contract offers return $c_2$ if the consumer withdraws at date 1 and $c_2^*$ at date 2 if the consumer does not, where

$$1 < c_1 < c_2 < R.$$

In equilibrium, patient consumers with no access to financial markets just consume $c_2^*$. Patient consumers with such access withdraw $c_1$ and reinvest in one of these long-term investment vehicles yielding $R$; they consume

$$c_2^* = c_2 R > R.$$

The extent of flattening of the bank’s yield curve relative to the technological yield curve then depends on the fraction of consumers with no access to financial markets. If this fraction is important, extensive cross-subsidies à la Diamond-Dybvig are doable; if not, then the bank must offer a steep yield curve close to the technological yield curve.

12.2.5 Economizing on Liquidity by Rolling over Deposits

Let us ignore the Jacklin critique and address another potential enrichment of the Diamond-Dybvig model. By not describing the economy as an ongoing one, Diamond and Dybvig overestimate the need for low-yield liquid assets, at least in a relatively stationary context. The idea is that if investments by incoming generations of consumers (new investors) offset the disinvestments by earlier generations of investors facing liquidity needs, then no asset needs to be liquidated and everything can be invested in the high-yield long-term asset.

Following Qi (1994), consider an overlapping-generations (OLG) version of the Diamond-Dybvig model in which:

- a new generation ("generation t") invests its savings (1 per individual) at date t, and lives up to date $t + 2$;
- members of this generation learn at date $t + 1$ whether their utility function is $u(c_{t+1}^1)$ (probability $\lambda$) or $u(c_{t+1}^2)$ (probability $1 - \lambda$), where $c_t^1$ is generation t’s consumption at date $t$;
- the population is constant; and
- the technology is similar to that described above: 1 unit of "long-term investment" yields $R > 1$ two periods later; 1 unit of "short-term investment" yields 1 one period later.

9. One can envision that this arbitrage is enabled by financial entities that invest in the long-term asset and roll it at cost (1) at date 1 to these type-2A consumers.
Table 12.1 summarizes the timing.

Consider a bank that in steady state offers consumption profile $c_1$ (for the impatient), $c_2$ (for the patient) so as to maximize the depositors’ expected utility:

$$\max (\lambda u(c_1) + (1 - \lambda) u(c_2)).$$  \hfill (12.11)

This bank needs not invest in low-yield short-term investments. At period $t + 2$, say, it can employ the return $R$ on the generation $t$’s deposits invested in high-yield assets, to honor the deposit withdrawal by generation $t$’s patient types and generation $t + 1$’s impatient types. Thus, the budget constraint is

$$\lambda c_1 + (1 - \lambda) c_2 \leq R.$$  \hfill (12.12)

Note that the maximization of (12.11) subject to (12.12) yields perfect insurance:

$$c_1 = c_2 = R.$$  \hfill (12.13)

This allocation, which exhibits a downward-sloping yield curve, however, is not incentive compatible if patient consumers can withdraw and reinvest in a similar bank (or the same bank under a different name). Such arbitrage indeed imposes that

$$(c_1)^2 \leq c_2.$$  \hfill (12.14)

That is, if the consumer can withdraw and reinvest, the yield curve must be either flat ($c_1^2 = c_2$) or upward sloping ($c_1^2 < c_2$). Given that the optimal yield curve in the absence of constraint (12.13) is downward sloping, the constrained optimal yield curve is flat:

$$c_1^2 = c_2,$$

which implies

$$c_2 > R > c_1 > 1.$$  \hfill (12.15)

This analysis requires that there be no aggregate uncertainty and that the economy be in a steady state. In particular, Gë (1994) looks at how a bank can get started. We refer to the paper for more detail.

While highly stylized, this OLG analysis captures an important aspect of reality. Banks make heavy use of the facts that demand deposits are rolled over, and that, to honor the promises made in previous deposit agreements, they can attract new deposits rather than liquidate their long-term assets. The same strategy plays an important role on the equity side as well. For example, the underlying assets in a closed-end mutual fund (whose shares are sold on the open market) are not liquidated when an investor wants to sell her share. Rather, this share is transferred to another investor.

Allen and Gale (1997, 2000, Chapter 6) analyze an OLG model with a safe and a risky asset. The safe asset can be accumulated over time. Financial markets allow cross-sectional risk-sharing opportunities to be exploited, but may provide insufficient intertemporal risk smoothing. An interconnected system fares better in the latter dimension. However, the intertemporal smoothing provided by a long-lived intermediary is fragile as arbitrage opportunities undermine the insurance it offers.

12.3 Runs

12.3.1 Depositor Panics

A substantial fraction of the literature on consumer liquidity demand, starting with Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), is preoccupied with the possibility of bank runs. \[^{10}\] A basic hazard faced by financial institutions performing a maturity transformation function is the risk that depositors run for exit even when they do not actually experience liquidity needs. A run may occur when long-term assets are liquidated in order to honor the withdrawal demands. Thus, if other depositors withdraw, even a patient depositor has an incentive to withdraw since
the financial institution then becomes an empty shell.

To understand the mechanics of bank runs, consider the technology described in the previous section, with

\[ I = r_1 = r_2 = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad R > 1. \]

That is, a unit long-term investment yields \( R \) if carried to its maturity, but only 1 if it is liquidated at date 1. The short-term technology in each period is a storage technology that transforms 1 unit of good into 1 unit of good in a given period into 1 unit of good in the following period. The long-term investment here dominates the short-term investment, and we will therefore focus on investment policies in which the bank invests solely in the long-term asset:

\[ i_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad i_2 = 1. \]

The representative consumer, as before, saves 1 at date 0 and learns her type at date 1; with probability \( \lambda \), the consumer is impatient and has utility \( u(c_1) \), and with probability \( 1 - \lambda \), the consumer is patient and has utility \( u(c_2) \). We assume that a patient consumer who withdraws at date 1 has access to the storage technology and can thus consume at date 2 what she withdrew at date 1.

Consider the Diamond–Dybvig allocation (letting \( L \) denote the fraction of the long-term asset that is liquidated at date 1):

\[
\lambda c_1 = L, \\
(1 - \lambda) c_2 = R (1 - L).
\]

This program is equivalent to

\[
\max_{(c_1, c_2)} \left\{ \lambda u(c_1) + (1 - \lambda) u(c_2) \right\},
\]

yielding, as earlier,

\[
\frac{u'(c_1)}{u'(c_2)} = R,
\]

and so, provided that the consumers’ coefficient of relative risk aversion exceeds 1,

\[ 1 < c_1^* < c_2^* < R. \]

Let \( \hat{\lambda} > \lambda \) denote the fraction of consumers who withdraw at date 1 (so \( \hat{\lambda} = \lambda + (1 - \lambda)x \), where \( x \) is the fraction of patient consumers who run on the bank). Because \( c_1^* < c_2^* \), the Diamond–Dybvig outcome \( \hat{\lambda} = \lambda \) is an equilibrium. But this equilibrium is not unique.

A consumer receives

\[
\min \left\{ c_1^*, \frac{1}{\lambda} \right\} \quad \text{if she withdraws at date 1},
\]

\[
\max \left\{ \left( 1 - \hat{\lambda} c_1^* \right) R, 0 \right\} \quad \text{if she does not.}
\]

To see this, note that the bank keeps liquidating long-term investments as long as it cannot honor the withdrawal requests. If \( \hat{\lambda} c_1^* < 1 \), then all such requests are satisfied, and the fraction \( (1 - \hat{\lambda}) \) of consumers who did not run receives the return \( R \) on the remaining long-term investment \( (1 - \hat{\lambda} c_1^*) \), which is less than \( c_2^* - (1 - \lambda c_1^*) (1 - \lambda) R \).

The payoffs are represented as functions of \( \hat{\lambda} \) for \( \hat{\lambda} > \lambda \) in Figure 12.2.

An interesting property of the strategic interaction among depositors is that the incentive to run (the difference between the consumptions when withdrawing at date 1 and waiting) increases with the number of other consumers who withdraw (at least as long as \( \hat{\lambda} < 1/c_1^* \), since beyond this value, a late withdrawer receives nothing anyway). This game exhibits “strategic complementarities” (my running increases your incentive to run). And indeed there is exactly one other stable equilibrium, in which all

![Figure 12.2 Incentive to run.](image)
consumers withdraw at date 1. This “bad or panic equilibrium” yields a low consumption for both the patient and the impatient types.\textsuperscript{12}

Large depositor. Suppose now that a fraction $\mu > 0$ of deposits is held by a large depositor.\textsuperscript{13} The fraction $1 - \mu$ is held by atomistic depositors (previously we had $\mu = 0$). Let us further assume that the large depositor has a single incarnation (patient or impatient), which, if we assume, as we will do, that the total fractions of “impatient and patient deposits” are fixed at levels $\lambda$ and $1 - \lambda$, respectively, requires that $\mu \leq \min(\lambda, 1 - \lambda)$.\textsuperscript{14} How is the analysis affected?\textsuperscript{15}

Suppose first that the large depositor turns out to be impatient. Then the analysis is unaltered, since the only strategies of interest are those of the patient depositors, who face a real choice between withdrawing and leaving their deposits at the bank.

In contrast, the analysis is changed when the large depositor is patient. On the one hand, the no-run equilibrium still exists (since $c^*_2 = c^*_1$). On the other hand, the panic equilibrium may disappear. A run can occur only if the large depositor does not find it in her interest to keep her money in the bank, or

$$1 \geq \frac{1 - \hat{\lambda}c^*_1}{1 - \hat{\lambda}} \text{ with } \hat{\lambda} = 1 - \mu.$$ 

Put differently, the risk of a run disappears if

$$(1 - \mu)(Rc^*_1 - 1) < R - 1.$$ 

In particular, for $\mu$ close to $1 - \lambda$ (most of the “patient deposits” are held by the large depositor), this latter condition is verified (from $c^*_1 < c^*_2$), and so there is no panic equilibrium. More generally, the panic equilibrium is less likely to exist, the larger the fraction of deposits held by a large player. This is easily understood: panics are generated by a lack of coordination. This coordination problem is less likely to be an issue if deposits are concentrated in large

\begin{itemize}
  \item[12.] As indicated in the figure, there is a third equilibrium with $3 < \lambda < 4$. This equilibrium is, however, unstable: suppose that a slightly higher fraction than $3$ withdraws. Then everyone else sooner or later-withdraws.
  \item[13.] To make things comparable, assume that the consumptions “$c_2$” of that depositor are consumptions per unit of deposit.
  \item[14.] More generally, we could avoid this restrictive assumption, and assume that the large depositor suffers a liquidity shock corresponding to a (random) fraction of her deposits.
  \item[15.] Large depositors are considered in Corsetti et al. (2002) and in a version closer to that adopted here (Ventura (2002)).
\end{itemize}

12. Consumer Liquidity Demand

12.3.2 Antirun Policies

As was recognized by Diamond and Dybvig and the subsequent literature, there are various ways to prevent bad equalibria from happening.

12.3.2.1 Suspension of Convertibility

One policy for preventing runs is a suspension of convertibility (Gorton 1985, 1988). Before the design of deposit insurance schemes, suspensions of convertibility occurred frequently. For example, the American banking system suspended convertibility eight times between 1814 and 1907.

The idea behind a suspension of convertibility is straightforward. Suppose that the bank announces that it will stop honoring demand deposits with- drawal once level $\lambda$ is reached. Patient depositors then know that there will be enough long-term investment around at date 2 to honor their date-2 claim $c^*_2$. And so they have no incentive to run.\textsuperscript{16}

Suspensions of convertibility are, of course, no panacea. They raise a moral-hazard problem on the bank’s side. The run may actually be triggered by bad news about the bank’s fundamentals (we will come back to this). In this case, the bank, if given the right to suspend convertibility may use this right to stop outflows even when its management, rather than a pure depositor panic, is the culprit for the run. This is why suspensions of convertibility are better en-trusted to the central bank (or at the country level with the International Monetary Fund), even though these solutions are not without hazard either.

12.3.2.2 Credit Line and Lender of Last Resort

Second, the bank may have an explicit or implicit credit line with another financial institution or the central bank that protects it against a run. Again, if patient consumers know that long-term assets will not be forced to liquidation by a run, they have no reason to worry and therefore do not withdraw their deposits.

\textsuperscript{16} See Green and Lin (2003) and Peck and Shell (2003) for studies of more general contingent withdrawal contracts, in which the amount that can be withdrawn depends on the number of consumers who have already withdrawn.
Of course, in the case of a private sector arrangement, the credit line mechanism can protect only against a run on a single bank or a small number of banks. To avoid a run on a single bank, it suffices that each bank stand ready to liquidate a small amount of its long-term assets to come to the rescue of the endangered bank (or to hoard a little more liquidity than needed if $l < 1$).

However, such arrangements cannot protect the banking sector as a whole. If runs occur simultaneously on all banks, liquidity must be provided from elsewhere (the central bank or abroad).

12.3.2.3 Interbank and Other Liquidity Markets

Alternatively, banks can make up for temporary shortfalls in liquidity by borrowing liquidity in the interbank market. A solvent bank, with fully pledgeable income $R_i$ in the model, can credibly promise to repay any date-1 loan that is destined only to honor the deposit withdrawals.

While "bank runs" have a negative connotation and much thought has been given to how to avoid them, another strand of the literature, initiated by Calomiris and Kahn (1991), emphasizes the benefits of creating competition in monitoring. The possibility of a bank run keeps depositors (or, presumably, at least large ones) on their toes. They are then induced to collect information about the bank's performance. There is then a tradeoff between the inefficiency generated by liquidations and the disciplining benefit associated with the monitoring of banking moral hazard.17

12.4 Heterogenous Consumer Horizons and the Diversity of Securities

In the Diamond–Dybvig model, consumers are identical ex ante (although not ex post), and a single claim fits them all. In practice, consumers are heterogeneous in several respects, including their savings horizon, or, to use the terminology of this chapter, the frequency of liquidity shocks. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) provide an interesting extension of the Diamond-Dybvig model that allows for such heterogeneity.

Their study is motivated by the long-standing advice given by bankers to their clients: "If you save for the long term, invest in equities; if you are looking for liquidity, invest in debt instruments." The alleged "liquidity" benefits of debt in this advice does not quite refer to the possibility that equities cannot be resold quickly in well-functioning markets. Rather, it refers to the fear of trading against better-informed traders in such markets.

A useful innovation of the Gorton-Pennacchi model is to employ the consumer-liquidity-demand model to refine our understanding of market microstructure. In traditional models of markets microstructures (say, Kyle 1985), trade is driven by the presence of apparently irrational "liquidity traders" who trade assets without regard to their return. These liquidity traders generate value for the other traders and thereby give rise to trading volume.18

The Diamond-Dybvig model allows the model to endogenize liquidity trading by explicitly modeling preference shocks that give rise to a demand for altering one's portfolio. The benefit of this "rationalization" of liquidity trading is not purely aesthetic. As we will see, it shows that liquidity trading in equities is highly responsive to the set of securities that are offered in the market.

The Gorton-Pennacchi model is similar to Diamond and Dybvig’s, with two twists. First, the payoff of the long-term investment is uncertain and is not commonly observed at date 1. Second, the number of impatient consumers is also random and unobservable. In contrast, consumers are risk neutral, which eliminates the insurance focus that is so prominent in the Diamond-Dybvig literature.

There are three dates ($t = 0, 1, 2$).

Consumers. Consumers all have date-0 savings equal to 1, but are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their consumption horizon. More precisely, there are two categories of consumer.

17. See Chapters 8 and 9 for a discussion of the variety of ways in which incentives for monitoring can be designed.

18. Another approach is to assume that investors are risk-averse and learn over time news about their tastes or about the value of the components of their existing portfolios, and therefore want to rebalance these portfolios. This approach is much more complex (and depends on the set of futures and derivative markets allowed). Much of the microstructure literature therefore relies on the irrational-liquidity-traders approach.
Potential liquidity traders, in proportion \( \lambda \), have the following preferences:

\[
\begin{align*}
    &u(c_1, c_2) = c_1 & \text{with probability } \lambda, \\
    &u(c_1, c_2) = c_1 + c_2 & \text{with probability } 1 - \lambda.
\end{align*}
\]

As in Diamond and Dybvig, these consumers learn their preferences at date 1; the realized fraction of liquidity traders, \( \tilde{\lambda} \), takes two possible values, \( \lambda_l \) or \( \lambda_h \), with \( \lambda_h > \lambda_l \). The realization of \( \lambda \) is unobservable.

Long-term investors, in proportion \( 1 - \alpha \), have the following preferences:

\[
\begin{align*}
    &u(c_1, c_2) = c_1 + c_2 & \text{with probability } 1.
\end{align*}
\]

That is, long-term investors take a long-term perspective and never need money at date 1 (they are happy to get the return from their savings at date 2).

Technology. On the technology side, we will assume that the savings are invested in a long-term asset yielding a random \( \tilde{R} \) at date 2, where \( \tilde{R} = R_l \) or \( R_h > R_l \). This long-term return is publicly observable only at date 2 (when realized).

States of nature. Let us now turn to the probability distribution over the state of nature \( (\tilde{\lambda}, \tilde{R}) \).

In principle, there are four possible states of nature as each of these variables can take on two values. To simplify the computations, we will make two innocuous assumptions. First, \( \tilde{\lambda} \) and \( \tilde{R} \) are perfectly correlated in the following way. There are only two states of nature:

\[
\begin{align*}
    &\left(\lambda_l, R_l\right) \text{ with probability } q_l, \\
    &\left(\lambda_h, R_h\right) \text{ with probability } q_h.
\end{align*}
\]

with \( q_l + q_h = 1 \). Second, potential liquidity traders that are revealed patient do not have cash at date 1 to participate in the date-1 asset market. Only long-term investors (and possibly some newly arrived arbitrageurs) also with utility function \( c_1 + c_2 \) have date-1 resources to buy the shares sold by the impatient investors. (The second assumption is just meant to shorten the analysis by not having to consider the inferences drawn by the patient liquidity traders about the state of nature from the observation that they individually are patient. The first assumption focuses the analysis on those two states of nature in which the asset price may not reveal publicly the state of nature. The reader can alternatively assume four states of nature and follow the lines of Section 8.3 to check that the analysis in no way hinges on these two assumptions.)

Speculator. To formalize the idea that small investors may "lose their shirt" when disposing of the asset at date 1, let us assume that an informed trader, called the speculator, appears at date 1, who learns the state of nature and may buy as many shares as he likes (he has a large enough date-1 endowment). The speculator cannot engage in short sales; neither can any other economic agent. The speculator also has preferences \( c_1 + c_2 \). He places at date 1 an order flow. The date-1 arbitrageurs (long-term investors or newly arrived arbitrageurs) observe only the total order flow, that is, the impatient investors’ sales minus the speculator’s purchase, but cannot decompose this order flow to figure out exactly how much is demanded by the speculator (otherwise they could infer the state of nature from the speculator’s order flow, as we shall see shortly).

12.4.1 Trading Losses in the Stock Market

When informed that the state is \( L \), the speculator knows that the long-term payoff is \( R_l \) and since the asset price \( P \) necessarily lies in the interval \( [R_l, R_h] \), the speculator does not buy and so stays out of the market. The order flow is then equal to the impatient consumers’ sales:

\[
\alpha \lambda_l.
\]

When learning that the state is \( H \), the speculator buys a quantity \( b > 0 \) of shares. The dilemma facing the speculator is that a high demand reveals that the state is high, leading arbitrageurs to raise their own demand until the price is \( R_h \) and so there is no profit opportunity. More formally, the order flow is now

\[
\alpha \lambda_h - b.
\]

The only value of purchases by the speculator that does not reveal that the payoff is \( R_h \) is

\[
b = \alpha (\lambda_h - \lambda_l).
\]
The equilibrium involves full pooling. Arbitrageurs learn nothing about the state of nature, and their posterior belief that the state is $H$ is still $q_H$. And so the market price of shares at date 2 is always

$$P = q_H R_H + q_L R_L.$$ 

This pooling gives rise to adverse selection in the stock market. Arbitrageurs (who, after all, are not forced to trade) are not affected by this adverse selection, as they discount the price to reflect the asymmetry of information. The victims of adverse selection are the impatient consumers or liquidity traders, who sell at a price reflecting the ex ante expectation, even though the high state is more likely per unit of sale (the liquidity traders sell more in the high state).

The speculator makes (ex ante) expected profit,

$$\pi = q_H (\alpha(\lambda_H - \lambda_L)) (R_H - P).$$

That is, the speculator trades only in the high state (probability $q_H$). He then trades as much as is consistent with not revealing his information ($\alpha(\lambda_H - \lambda_L)$), and makes profit $R_H - P$ per share purchased. The speculator’s profit can be rewritten as

$$\pi = \alpha(\lambda_H - \lambda_L) q_H (R_H - R_L).$$

Note, in particular, that this profit grows with the fraction of potential liquidity traders and with the uncertainty about the extent of their actual liquidity trading.

To confirm that the speculator feeds off the potential liquidity traders, let us compute the latter’s expected loss:

$$q_H \lambda_H (R_H - P) - q_L \lambda_L (P - R_L) = (\lambda_H - \lambda_L) q_H (R_H - R_L) = \frac{\pi}{\alpha}.$$ 

The speculator’s profit is indeed equal to a potential liquidity trader’s expected loss times the number ($\alpha$) of such traders.

12.4.2 Debt as a Low-Information-Intensity Security and the Equity Premium

As in Chapter 8, the liquidity traders’ loss can be interpreted as generating an equity premium. In order for potential liquidity traders to hold the stock, they must be enticed by a date-0 price discount, or equivalently an equity premium (a higher return). There are (at least) two equivalent versions that can be offered for depicting this phenomenon in the context of this bare-bones model. First, potential liquidity traders demand to pay less than the expected return. Namely, the price discount per share is equal to $\pi/\alpha$ so that the issuer must price shares at $q_H R_H + q_L R_L - (\pi/\alpha)$ in order to arouse interest from liquidity traders. Second, were the stock sold solely to the long-term investors (which requires that they have enough savings to purchase all the shares), the price would jump by $\pi/\alpha$ to $q_H R_H + q_L R_L$.

This equity premium observation (which is not specific to the Gorton–Pennacchi model, and is rather a general implication of the logic of market microstructure) also fits well with the well-known fact that the return on equity grows with the holding length. As popular wisdom commands, the stock market is more appealing to long-term investors than to short-term ones.

Let us push the comparison with the analysis of Chapter 8 a bit further. Speculation (the acquisition of private information about returns in order to profit from trading securities) is here a purely parasitical activity. It is even socially wasteful if either the speculator incurs a cost (presumably smaller than $\pi$) in order to acquire the information, or if the potential liquidity traders are discouraged from buying the security because they will “lose their shirt” and do not find an alternative and substitutable security to invest in.

The perspective on speculation provided by Gorton and Pennacchi is therefore quite different from the Holmström and Tirole (1993) view expounded in Chapter 8. There, even though we stressed that there could be excessive speculation, we emphasized the benefits of market monitoring. We argued that speculators’ greed creates a measure of the value of assets in place, and therefore allows firms to assess the performance of their management. In other words, market monitoring is an integral part of the firms’ governance mechanism. We will later return to this discussion.

Returning to the Gorton–Pennacchi model, we observed that potential liquidity traders are willing to pay less than long-term investors for the shares. This
suggests that it is in the interest of the security designers to introduce a security that is better suited to their needs, and thereby offer a menu of securities. Indeed, suppose that

$$\alpha(q_R q_R + q_R R_L) \leq R_L. \quad (12.14)$$

This condition is more likely to be satisfied when the projects have sufficient guaranteed income or collateral ($R_L$) and when there are few potential liquidity traders. The security designers can then offer a fraction $\alpha$ (or more generally a fraction between $\alpha$ and $R_L$) of securities with safe payoff $q_R R_L + q_R R_L$ (or slightly less\(^{21}\)) at date 2. The residual claim on the long-term projects is then sold to the public in equity shares. The safe debt security appeals to potential liquidity traders because it is not affected by adverse selection. Its final payoff is independent of the state of nature and is therefore common knowledge. Thus, as long as condition (12.14) holds, the equity premium, or equivalently the profit that can be enjoyed by an informed speculator, vanishes.

In contrast, if

$$\alpha(q_R R_L + q_R R_L) > R_L,$$

there are too many potential liquidity traders in the market to accommodate entirely with a safe claim. They must bear some of the risk and therefore the equity premium reappears.

12.4.3 A Broader Perspective

The issuance of debt illustrates a broader strategy already alluded to in Chapter 8: investors who may be forced to sell fear that they will be trading against better-informed players and try to avoid this likely loss by purchasing securities that are less exposed to asymmetric information. Another way of limiting costly trade with speculators is to buy bundles of indices on the grounds that they are less exposed to asymmetric information "thanks to the law of large numbers": stock index futures, closed-end mutual funds, real-estate investment trusts, etc. The general idea is that even though one may be poorly informed about the value of a particular firm, one is on average better informed about that of a bundle of firms as an overappreciation of a firm’s value tends to be compensated by an underappreciation of another (see Subrahmanyam 1991; Gorton and Pennacchi 1993). This is easily illustrated in the context of "continuum of firms" with independent date-2 profit realizations. The per-firm ex post value of the index is then a deterministic $q_R R_L + q_R R_L$, and so potential liquidity traders can enjoy liquidity without any sacrifice in return.

There is some empirical support for this view. For example, the bid–ask spread (which in part measures the extent of the adverse-selection problem) for the index is about one-tenth of that in individual stocks. Furthermore, the spectacular development of index funds in the last two decades points to the benefits of such bundling.

This evolution toward debt and bundles of equity claim is privately rational for (at least short-term) investors. It is also socially desirable if one subscribes to the view of Gorton and Pennacchi. On the other hand, it also jeopardizes the role of financial markets as a monitoring device,\(^{22}\) and therefore has potentially detrimental effects. The cost involved in turning companies public and in spinning off divisions to have them listed individually are evidence of a demand for market monitoring. An important research topic is therefore to combine the negative and positive aspects of market monitoring and to analyze whether the investors' private incentives will in the future affect the relevant tradeoffs.\(^{23}\)

20. We can assume that these security designers correspond to the corporate entities that invest in the long-term projects. Alternatively, these corporate entities could issue just stocks, and financial markets could perform the repackaging of these stocks by stripping the debt component from the stocks and offering it as a safe debt derivative instrument. As long as financial markets are competitive and efficient, the initial stocks would not include an equity premium, due to the expectation of subsequent repackaging.

21. In order to make sure that the long-term investors are not attracted to buy the debt security.

22. At least of the speculative/passive type studied in Chapter 8; concerning active monitoring (see Chapter 9), index funds do have some influence as they are not exposed by business ties.

23. While this section has assumed that trading costs are governed by adverse selection in asset markets, another relevant consideration is the existence of transaction costs. Favero et al. (2005) analyze a Diamond-Dybvig model in which consumers can buy or sell at date 1 some assets with heterogeneous and exogenously determined transmission costs. Consumers can only trade the set of primary assets (and so, in standard microstructure theory, consumers cannot economize on transaction costs by trading asset bundles or derivatives).
12.5 Aggregate Uncertainty and Risk Sharing

The analysis of interest rates in Section 12.2 focused on the term structure and neglected the allocation of the interest rate risk in an economy by assuming that there was no aggregate risk. In practice, interest rate risk is a serious issue, and financial institutions have developed various instruments, such as interest rate swaps, to reallocate the risk among economic agents. Ultimately, some consumers—banks, corporations, or other agents—must bear the risk. A question confronting both the private sector and public policy (e.g., through the regulatory treatment of value at risk in banking institutions) is who should actually bear it.

To start analyzing interest rate risk, Hellwig (1994) extends the Diamond–Dybvig model to allow for an uncertain realization at date 1 of the date-2 return on short-term investment $R_2$. The randomness of $R_2$ is a metaphor for a more general uncertainty about the rate of return on new investments in the economy.  

Consumers’ preferences are as described in Section 12.2: facing known probability $\lambda$ of a liquidity shock, their expected utility is

$$E[\lambda u(c_1) + (1-\lambda)u(c_2)],$$

where $c_1$ denotes the consumer’s date-1 consumption in the state of nature in which she is impatient, $c_2$ the date-2 consumption when she is patient, and the expectation will refer to the impact of aggregate uncertainty on these consumptions. The utility function $u$’s coefficient of relative risk aversion $(\cdot'\cdot u'/u')$ exceeds 1.25.

A consumer’s date-0 savings, equal to 1, are allocated between the short- and long-term investments:

$$t_1 + t_2 = 1.$$

Technology is described as in Diamond and Dybvig except for the aggregate uncertainty about $R_2$. A unit of short-term (liquid) investment sunk at date 0 yields $r_1$ at date 1. A unit of short-term investment sunk at date 1 yields $r_2$ at date 2. The value of $r_2$ is publicly learned at date 1. A unit of long-term (illiquid) investment sunk at date 0 yields $R$ at date 2, and $I < r_1$ if liquidated at date 1. To keep the model as closely related to Diamond and Dybvig as possible, let us assume that liquidating the long-term project never delivers a higher return that the long-term project itself:

$$I r_2 < K$$ for all realizations of $R_2$.  \[12.15\]

The random variable $r_2$ is assumed to have a continuous distribution with support included in $(0,K/L)$.

12.5.1 Socially Optimal Insurance

The first-best outcome is a choice of investments $t_1$, $t_2$ and ($r_2$-contingent) consumptions $c_1$ and $c_2$ and liquidation level $L$ solving

$$\max_{\{t_1,t_2,L\}\cap (1-\lambda)u(c_2)]} E[\lambda u(c_1) + \lambda u(c_2)],$$

s.t.

$$L 2 + L)\}

$$L 1 - \lambda c_2 \leq R (l_2 - L) + r_1 (r_1 l_1 + L L - \lambda c_2)$$

for all $R_2$, $t_1 + t_2 = 1$, $0 \leq L \leq l_2$ for all $R_2$.

The first constraint expresses the fact that impatient consumers’ consumption must be financed from the

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25. This assumption will be used in the "second-best analysis." See below.
return on the date-0 investment in liquid assets, plus, possibly, the liquidation of some of the long-term assets. As we will see, this constraint may or may not be binding. The second constraint says that the consumption of the patient consumers stems from the return on the unliquidated long-term asset, plus, possibly the leftover from period 1 reinvested at rate \( r_2 \); it is obviously binding since there is no point wasting resources.

We will say that there is earmarking (or matching of the term structures of investments and consumptions) if long-term investments serve to finance long-term consumption and short-term investments to finance short-term consumption:

\[
\begin{align*}
  c_1 &= \frac{r_1 i_1}{\lambda} \quad \text{and} \quad c_2 = \frac{R_2}{1 - \lambda},
\end{align*}
\]

Note that, under an earmarking policy, returns on deposits are guaranteed; in other words, consumptions at dates 1 and 2 are immunized against interest rate shocks (they are not contingent on \( r_2 \)).

Is it optimal to immunize depositors against interest rate risk? From the first-order conditions associated with the first-best program, it can be shown that it is never optimal to liquidate the long-term investment (\( i = 0 \)). Intuitively, the liquid investment always yields more than the illiquid one when it comes to generating date-1 income.

If reinvestment takes place at date 1 (i.e., \( r_1 i_1 > \lambda c_1 \)), the consumptions must solve the following ex post program (for a given \( r_2 \)):

\[
\begin{align*}
  \max_{c_1, c_2} \left( \lambda u(c_1) + (1 - \lambda) u(c_2) \right) \\
  \text{s.t.} \quad \frac{\lambda c_1 + (1 - \lambda) c_2}{r_2} = r_1 i_1 + \frac{R_2}{r_2}.
\end{align*}
\]

We have written the constraint so as to highlight the role of \( 1/r_2 \) as the relevant discount factor between dates 1 and 2 and the expression of the present discounted value of the endowment (on the right-hand side). Thus, if reinvestment occurs, then

\[
\frac{u'(c_1)}{u'(c_2)} = r_2 \frac{u'(c_1)}{u'(c_2)}.
\]

To forge intuition about these results, let us begin with (a). One should think of the interest rate risk as creating an option value in this first-best world: if \( r_2 \) is large, then the date-1 consumption can be reduced in order to take advantage of the favorable reinvestment opportunities. This implies imposing some sacrifice on the impatient types to benefit the patient types. The impatient consumers are, of course, unhappy when the interest rate turns out to be high at date 1. But this is part of a deal a consumer is happy to accept at date 0. Conclusively (b) follows directly from the presence of an option value, which makes liquid investments more valuable.

### 12.5.2 Incentive Compatibility

Let us now assume more realistically that the patient consumers can feign impatience and reinvest their withdrawal elsewhere at rate \( r_2 \). The incentive to do so will, of course, depend heavily on the realization of \( r_2 \). A high-interest rate then becomes a double-edged sword. It offers investors an option value, but it also incentivizes them to behave opportunistically and to abuse the insurance deal.

The second-best solution is obtained by solving the first-best program to which is appended the incentive compatibility constraint:

\[
r_2 c_1 \leq c_2 \quad \text{for all } r_2.
\]

This incentive compatibility condition creates a second rationale for a negative dependence of \( c_1 \) on \( r_2 \); generous terms on short-term deposits encourage opportunistic withdrawals. We refer to Hellwig's
12.6 Private Signals and Uniqueness in Bank Run Models

paper for a full treatment of the second-best solution when \( R_2 \) exceeds 1 with probability 1. Two striking results (c) and (d) are as follows.

(c) In the reinvestment region, the impatient consumers bear the entire valuation risk of long-term investment while the patient consumers bear the entire rollover risk of short-term investment. In particular, no one is immunized against interest rate risk.

To see this, return to the first-best ex post program (12.16). We noted that the budget constraint corresponds to an income equal to the sum of the dividend on the liquid investment and the date-1 discounted dividend on the illiquid one. Condition (12.17) reflected a desire to provide some insurance to benefit the impatient type. This insurance, however, is undermined by the incentive compatibility condition: (12.17) together with \( R_2 > 1 \) implies that \( c_1 < c_2 \); the assumption that the coefficient of relative risk aversion exceeds 1 then implies that \( c_1 u'(c_1) > c_2 u'(c_2) \) and so (12.17) yields \( r_2 c_1 > c_2 \). We thus conclude that (12.18) is binding:

\[
R_2 c_1 = c_2.
\]

This in turn implies that the two types can be given the same income \( r_1 i_1 + (R_i/k) \) at date 1 (assuming there is no liquidation. The same is true if there is liquidation); and so

\[
c_1 = r_1 i_1 + \frac{R_i}{r_2} \quad \text{and} \quad c_2 = r_2 (r_1 i_1 + R_i). \tag{12.19}
\]

These expressions make it clear that the impatient types fully bear the valuation (or execution) risk on the long-term asset and are hurt when the interest rate rises; conversely, the patient types fully bear the risk of rolling over the short-term return \( r_1 i_1 \) and benefit from increases in the interest rate.

(d) Liquidation may become optimal.

To obtain a rough intuition as to why this may be the case, note that (12.18) suggests reducing \( c_1 \) and therefore first-period investment \( i_1 \). On the other hand, when \( r_2 \) is low, reinvestment does not pay off and incentive compatibility is not an issue. It may be optimal to increase \( c_1 \) beyond \( i_1 / \lambda \) by liquidating some of the long-term investment provided that \( \lambda \) is not too low. Thus, liquidation, if it occurs at all, is associated with low-interest-rate episodes. The second-best result according to which, in the reinvestment region, the impatient consumers bear the valuation risk and the patient ones the rollover risk extends to the case in which liquidation is optimal.

12.6 Private Signals and Uniqueness in Bank Run Models

As discussed in Section 12.3, a large literature in the last two decades has stressed the multiplicity of equilibria associated with deposit contracts. A recent and interesting strand of the literature, starting with Morris and Shin (1998), argues that the multiplicity tends to disappear provided that the economic agents receive private signals about the return to being patient and that their posterior beliefs have wide enough support.\(^{27}\)

Morris and Shin’s work is meant to address international financial crises.\(^27\) As we will see, it captures some aspects of banking crises but not others. Like the bank run literature, it embodies a strategic complementarity: if other investors act in one way (say, run), that makes me more eager to act in that particular way (also run). But it also assumes that investors are better off when a run succeeds, while in banking models runs destroy the investors’ value.

12.6.1 The Speculators’ Game

Morris and Shin’s stylized model of currency crises goes as follows: investors (also called speculators) can be thought of as being foreign investors. The central bank of a country has a level of foreign reserves \( \theta \) unknown to investors. The central bank behaves mechanistically: it spends reserves to ward off speculation as long as there are some left. If \( S \) is the

-----


27. The version presented here is drawn from Corsetti et al. (2002),
In the private signal case, each investor receives his own signal; that is, $\eta$ is i.i.d. across investors. (We could, of course, study the more general case in which investors receive both a public and a private signal. The results would be intermediate between those derived below.)

12.6.1.1 Public Signal

Under a public signal, the outcome resembles that in standard coordination games. There is a range $[y, y']$ of public signals for which there are multiple equilibria.

The no-run equilibrium exists provided that an individual investor does not find it profitable to attack the currency when others do not (and so the currency collapses only if $\theta < 0$): 

\[
(1 - c) Pr(\theta \leq 0 \mid y) - cPr(\theta > 0 \mid y) \leq 0, \\
\text{or} \\
(1 - c)[1 - F(y/\sigma)] - cF(y/\sigma) \leq 0, \\
\text{or else} \\
F(y/\sigma) \leq 1 - c.
\] (12.20)

Equation (12.20), taken as an equality, defines a unique $y$. And so it is an equilibrium for no one to attack as long as $y \geq y'$.

Similarly, a run equilibrium exists provided that an individual investor prefers attacking when the others attack (and so the currency collapses whenever $\theta \geq 1$):

\[
(1 - c) Pr(\theta \leq 1 \mid y) - cPr(\theta > 1 \mid y) \geq 0 \\
\text{or} \\
1 - c \geq F(y/\sigma) - 1 \\
\] (12.21)

Condition (12.21), taken as an equality, defines a threshold $y \geq y'$, such that a run equilibrium exists if and only if $y \leq y'$.

Note that this "run equilibrium" cannot be called a "panic equilibrium." Indeed, when $y \in [y, y']$ investors are better off coordinating on an attack. In a sense, "panicking" corresponds to "staying put."

12.6.1.2 Private Signals

Let us now assume that investor $i$ ($i \in [0, 1]$) receives signal $y_i = \theta + \sigma \eta_i$.

### Table 12.2 Payoffs in speculation game.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack succeeds ($S &gt; \theta$)</th>
<th>Individual investor attacks</th>
<th>Individual investor does not attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1 - c$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-c$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mass of financial resources mobilized by investors, then the currency collapses if and only if $S \geq \theta$.

(This is meant to be a reduced form for a situation in which the country initially maintains a peg, and, if speculation is successful, the peg is abandoned and the currency devalued.) The level of investors’ resources that can be mobilized to attack the currency is normalized to 1 (there is mass 1 of small investors)[28]. And so $S \in [0, 1]$. In contrast, $\theta$ may exceed 1, in which case speculation against the currency in always unsuccessful, or be negative (say, because the country has contracted previous senior debts), in which case attacks always succeed regardless of their magnitude.

Assume that an investor individually pays a fixed cost $c \in (0, 1)$ when attacking the currency, and gains 1 when the attack is successful and he has been part of it.[29] The investors’ decisions whether to attack the currency are simultaneous. An individual investor’s contingent payoff is described in Table 12.2.

While the level of reserves $\theta$ is unknown, investors receive a signal as to its value. This signal $y$ is equal to the true value plus noise:

\[ y = \theta + \sigma \eta, \]

where $\eta$ has mean 0 and $\sigma$ measures the spread of the precision of the signal. The variable $\eta$ has cumulative distribution $F$ with continuous density on, say, $(-\infty, +\infty)$.

In the public signal case, $\eta$ is the same for all investors, who therefore have the same information.

---

28. See Corsetti et al. (2004) for the study of a similar game when there is a large investor.

29. In general, payoffs under successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks depend on the exchange rate, which in turn depends on the size of the speculative attack and the government response to it. The speculation game may exhibit strategic complementarities or strategic substitutabilities (see Pethuk and Tinsley 2005).
and the noises are i.i.d. A simple "revealed preference" argument shows that in equilibrium investor \( i \) attacks the currency if and only if this signal lies below some threshold \( \gamma^* \) (this is because the investor's net expected payoff to attacking the currency is decreasing in the signal). Let us look for a symmetric equilibrium (this is actually not restrictive; \( \gamma^* = \gamma^* \).

The amount of resources involved in the attack is then
\[
S(\theta) = F\left( \frac{\gamma^* - \theta}{\sigma} \right),
\]
and the currency collapses if and only if
\[
S(\theta) \geq 0.
\]
Because \( S \) is decreasing in \( \theta \), the currency collapses if and only if \( \theta \leq \theta^* \), where
\[
F\left( \frac{\gamma^* - \theta^*}{\sigma} \right) = 0^*.
\]

Second, investor \( i \) attacks the currency if and only if
\[
(1 - c) \Pr(\theta \leq \theta^* | y_i) - c \Pr(\theta > \theta^* | y_i) \geq 0.
\]
And so \( \gamma^* \) is defined by
\[
1 - c = F\left( \frac{\gamma^* - \theta^*}{\sigma} \right).
\]
Combining (12.22) and (12.23), we obtain
\[
\theta^* = 1 - c.
\]
Thus, \( \theta^* \) and \( \gamma^* \) are uniquely determined. The uniqueness of equilibrium enhances predictive power.\(^{20}\) When the investors' information is precise (\( \sigma \) close to 0), then \( \gamma^* \) converges to \( \theta^* \).

### 12.6.2 The Depositors' Game

The bank run literature bears some resemblance to the analysis of the speculators' game in the previous subsection. But it differs from it in that runs are inefficient from the point of view of investors.\(^{21}\) Another key difference is that, unlike the games considered in Carlsson and van Damme and by Morris and Shin, the game does not quite exhibit strategic complementarities: as Figure 12.2 demonstrates, the net incentive to withdraw is not an increasing function of the number of other consumers who withdraw.

Let us return to the bank run model of Section 12.3, assuming that \( l = 1 \). Recall that if depositors are entitled to withdraw some arbitrary level \( c_i \) at date 1, and fraction \( \lambda \) of depositors exercise this option, the consumptions of the early and late withdrawers are
\[
c_i(\lambda) = \min\left\{ c_i, \frac{1}{\lambda} \right\}
\]
and
\[
c_i(\lambda, R) = \max\left\{ 1 - \frac{\lambda R}{1 - \lambda}, 0 \right\}.
\]
Patient consumers have utility \( c_1 + c_2 \), and therefore choose the highest of the two. Let us extend the model of Section 12.3 in two respects:

- the date-2 return \( R \) is random and drawn from some cumulative distribution on \([0, \infty]\);
- this return is unobserved, but each depositor \( i \) in \((0, 1)\) observes a private signal \( y_i = R + \sigma \eta_i \), where the noises \( \{\eta_i, i \in (0,1)\} \) have mean 0 and are i.i.d. across depositors; they are drawn from some cumulative distribution \( F \) with continuous density \( f \).

We maintain the assumption that the bank offers a deposit contract, that is, the option to withdraw some fixed amount \( c_1 \) at date 1.

A (symmetric) equilibrium is then defined by a threshold \( \gamma^* \) such that depositor \( i \), when patient, withdraws if and only if \( y_i \leq \gamma^* \), and a fraction \( \lambda^* \) of withdrawing depositors,\(^{22}\) with
\[
\lambda^*(\gamma^*, R) = \lambda + (1 - \lambda) F\left( \frac{\gamma^* - R}{\sigma} \right).
\]
It must also be the case that a depositor with signal \( \gamma^* \) is indifferent between withdrawing and not withdrawing:
\[
E[c_1(\lambda^*(\gamma^*, R), R)] = E[c_1(\lambda^*(\gamma^*), R), R],
\]
where expectations are taken with respect to the random variable \( R \).

---

\(^{20}\) Angelotis et al. (2005) study a framework that is similar to that of Morris and Shin, but allow for a publicly observed policy choice by the policy maker before investors decide whether to attack. As in Morris and Shin, the equilibrium would be unique if the policy choice were exogenous. However, the endogeneity and observability of the policy reintroduce multiple equilibria in this model.

\(^{21}\) This distinction between the speculators' game and the depositors' game is drawn from Ventura (2001).

\(^{22}\) Thus \( \lambda^*(\gamma^*, R) \) is the counterpart of \( S(\theta) \) in the speculators' game.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) analyze a related model (the technology succeeds or fails at date 2 and the probability of success is drawn from a continuous distribution). Their key insight is that while the depositor game does not exhibit strategic complementarities, it satisfies a weaker property (that they label "one-sided strategic complementarities"), namely, that the net incentive to withdraw increases with the number of withdrawing agents whenever this incentive is negative (see Figure 12.2).

They generalize the uniqueness result under this weaker property. They are then able to perform comparative statics exercises. For example, the probability of a bank run increases continuously with the degree of risk sharing offered by the intermediary.

12.7 Exercises

Exercise 12.1 (Diamond–Dybvig model in continuous time). Following von Thadden (1997), suppose that the representative consumer in the Diamond–Dybvig model has wealth 1 at date 0 and will need to consume at a time \( t \in [0, 1] \). Namely, the date of the liquidity shock, instead of taking two possible values (periods 1 and 2 in Diamond–Dybvig), belongs to an interval. It is distributed according to cumulative distribution function \( F(t) \) (\( F(0) = 0, F(1) = 1 \)) with continuous density \( f(t) \). The representative consumer’s expected utility is therefore

\[
U = \int_0^1 w(c(t)) f(t) \, dt,
\]

where \( c(t) \) is her consumption if the liquidity shock occurs at time \( t \).

On the technological side, suppose that one can at any point in time invest in “trees” that then grow until they are harvested. One unit of investment liquidated at maturity \( m \) yields \( R(m) \). So an investment made at \( \tau \) and “harvested” at \( t > \tau \) yields \( R(t - \tau) \) per unit. We assume that \( R(0) = 1, R > 0 \) (where a dot indicates a time derivative), and \( \dot{R} / R \), the instantaneous technological rate of return, is increasing in \( m \). This implies in particular that a series of short-term investments yields less than a long-term investment with equivalent total length.

The choice is thus not about an allocation of investment at the initial date, and the exercise focuses entirely on the insurance aspects. Under autarky, the representative consumer receives expected utility

\[
\int_0^1 u(R(t)) f(t) \, dt.
\]

A bank offers a deposit contract in which a depositor chooses the date of withdrawal and obtains \( c(t) \) if she withdraws at time \( t \in [0, 1] \). The depositors’ liquidity shocks are i.i.d.

(i) Assume first that the realization of each depositor’s liquidity shock is observable by the bank (so there is no incentive compatibility issue). Show that in the optimal insurance policy

\[
U(c(t)) R(t)
\]

is independent of \( t \).

(ii) Assuming that the coefficient of relative risk aversion exceeds 1, conclude that there is “front loading,”

\[
\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} > \frac{\dot{R}(t)}{R(t)}
\]

and so

\[
c(t) > R(t) \quad \text{for } t < t^*
\]

and

\[
c(t) < R(t) \quad \text{for } t > t^* \text{ for some } t^* \in (0, 1).
\]

(iii) Show that the “first-best outcome” described above is not incentive compatible, in the sense that depositors may want to withdraw early and reinvest in the technology themselves.

Exercise 12.2 (Allen and Gale (1998) on fundamentals-based panics). Consider the Diamond–Dybvig model developed in Section 12.2 and add randomness in the payoff of the long-term asset. Consumers are Diamond–Dybvig consumers: they invest 1 at date 0, and learn at date 2 whether they are impatient (their utility is \( u(c_1) \)) or patient (their utility is \( u(c_2) \)). The probability of being impatient is \( \lambda \).

The liquid or short-term technology yields one-for-one in each period: \( r_1 = r_2 = 1 \). The illiquid, long-term technology yields a random \( R \) (the same for all illiquid investments). The cumulative distribution is \( F(R) \) and the density \( f(R) \) on \((0, \infty)\). Liquidating the long-term asset yields nothing \((l = 0)\).
One assumes $E(R) > 1$. The realization of $R$ is publicly observed at date 1.

(i) Compute the socially optimal insurance contract $(c_1(R), c_2(R))$, ignoring incentive compatibility (the ability of patient types to disguise as impatient ones). Note that this contract is incentive compatible.

(ii) Consider now a deposit contract. Consumers are promised, if they withdraw at date 1, a fixed payment $r$, or a share of $t_1$ if total withdrawal demand exceeds $t_2$. The date-2 income is shared among depositors who did not withdraw at date 1. Long-term assets are never liquidated. One will denote by $x(R) \in [0, 1]$ the fraction of patient consumers who "join the run" (declare they are impatient, and store the money they have withdrawn from the bank).

Show that a judicious choice of $c_1$ succeeds in implementing the social optimum described in (i).

Exercise 12.3 (depositors’ game with a public signal). Consider the depositors’ game of Section 12.6.2, except that the depositors receive the same signal:

$$y = R + \sigma \eta.$$

Determine the range of signals over which there exist multiple equilibria.

Exercise 12.4 (random withdrawal rate). Consider a three-date Diamond–Dybvig economy ($t = 0, 1, 2$). Consumers are ex ante identical; they save 1 at date 0. At date 1, consumers learn their preferences. A fraction $\lambda$ has utility $u(c_1)$ and a fraction $(1 - \lambda)$ has utility $u(c_2)$.

At date 0, the consumers put their savings in a bank. They later cannot withdraw and invest in financial markets, so the Jacklin critique does not apply. That is, incentive compatibility issues are ignored in this exercise (a patient depositor cannot masquerade as an impatient one). The bank invests the per-depositor savings into short- and long-term projects: $z_t + y_t = 1$. The long-term technology yields (per unit of investment) $R > 1$ at date 2, but only $I < 1$ if liquidated at date 1. The short-term technology yields 1 (so $r_1 = r_2 = 1$).

(i) Show that the optimal allocation $(c_1, c_2)$ satisfies $u'(c_1) = Ru'(c_2)$.

(ii) Suppose now that there is macroeconomic uncertainty, in that $\lambda$ is unknown: $\lambda = \lambda_0$ with probability $\beta$ and $\lambda = \lambda_1$ with probability $1 - \beta$, where $0 < \lambda_0 < \lambda_1 < 1$. Set up the optimal program (let $y_0$ and $z_0$ denote the fraction of short-term investment that is not rolled over, and the fraction of long-term investment that is liquidated, respectively, in state of nature $\omega \in \{L, H\}$). What does the solution look like for $I = 0$ and $I$ close to 1? (Showoffs: characterize the solution for a general $I$)

References


